

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MARCH, 1980

AFRICA, 1980

| | | |
|---|-------------------|-----|
| HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A LONG-AWAITED VOICE | Warren Weinstein | 97 |
| POPULATION GROWTH AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA | Yohannis Abate | 102 |
| THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN RHODESIA | Richard W. Hull | 107 |
| THE WESTERN SAHARA | Brian Weinstein | 110 |
| THE RETURN OF CIVILIAN RULE IN NIGERIA AND GHANA ... | Jon Kraus | 115 |
| CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA | John Grottpeter | 119 |
| WESTERN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA | Kenneth Adelman | 124 |
| BOOK REVIEWS • <i>On Africa</i> | | 127 |
| THE MONTH IN REVIEW • <i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i> | | 139 |
| MAP • <i>Africa</i> | Inside Back Cover | |

Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MARCH, 1980
VOLUME 78 NUMBER 455

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Associate Editor:

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

Assistant Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

JOAN B. ANTELL

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

Murray State University

O. EDMUND CLUBB

U.S. Foreign Service Officer (retired)

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

JOHN P. ROCHE

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Portland State University, Emeritus

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College, Emeritus

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

Current History (ISSN-0011-3530) is published monthly (combined issues May/June and July/August) for \$17.75 per year by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127; Editorial Office, RR 1, Box 132, Furlong, Pa. 18925. Second class postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: send address changes to Current History, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127. Indexed in The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, The Abridged Reader's Guide, ABC Polsci, PAIS and SSCI. Copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright ©1980, by Current History, Inc.

Coming Next Month

THE WORLD OF ISLAM

In our April, 1980, issue eight specialists examine the Islamic revival. Articles include:

The Islamic Past

by JOHN O. VOLL, University of New Hampshire

The Islamic Middle East

by RICHARD DEKMEJIAN, State University of New York, Binghamton

Islam in Southeast Asia

by CARL A. TROCKI, Thomas Moore College

Islam and Africa South of the Sahara

by JON KRAUS, State University of New York, Fredonia

North Africa's Muslims

by PETER BECHTOLD, Foreign Service Institute

Islam in South Asia

by SHAHEEN FATEMAH DIL, Mount Holyoke College

Muslim Minorities in the Soviet Union

by SHEIKH R. ALI, North Carolina Central University

Muslim Minority Groups Around the World

by RAPHAEL ISRAELI, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

\$2.25 a copy • \$17.75 a year

Canada \$19.25 a year • Foreign \$19.25 a year
Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

Current History

MARCH, 1980

VOL. 78, NO. 455

In this issue, recent political and economic developments in African nations are evaluated. Our introductory article points out that "In essence, the image projected by the Africa of the early 1970's was one of strife, mismanagement, cruel leadership and self-serving elites. Development goals were not being met, foreign debts were mounting and Africa's masses were worse off than they had been before independence when measured on any scale of quality of life." Today, in contrast, "The season of the Caesars may not have ended, but it is no longer the dominant direction of African events. The continent that René Dumont lamented as 'mal partie' (off to a bad start) has recognized its own problems."

Human Rights in Africa: A Long-Awaited Voice

BY WARREN WEINSTEIN

Director, Coordinating Council for International Issues

HUMAN rights became a frequent theme in global politics as the 1970's drew to a close. In July, 1979, Africa broke more than two decades of embarrassing silence to add its collective voice to those pressing for greater respect for universally recognized human rights. These rights are defined in many United Nations documents, key among which are the International Bill of Human Rights—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in 1976, with its Optional Protocol; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which also became effective in 1976.

At its July, 1979, meetings, the sixteenth session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference of Heads of State and Government resolved that it would draft and adopt an African Charter of Human Rights and Rights of People. The document is to be hammered out by a group of OAU-designated African experts, who held their first meetings from October 8 to November 29, 1979, at Dakar, the capital of Senegal.

As the name of the proposed document suggests, African governments differ on the emphasis to be given in defining human rights. On the one hand,

states like Madagascar prefer to speak of group rights ("rights of peoples") and not of individual rights. On the other hand, states like Senegal, Gambia and Botswana want to speak of the rights and duties of individuals as well as peoples. Human rights experts from the second group of states argue that individuals have rights and duties within the collectivity which is referred to as peoples.

The post-independence debate in black Africa about human rights has centered on the themes of decolonization, nondiscrimination and the condemnation of apartheid. In 1961, a conference was held at Lagos, Nigeria, on the rule of law. The proceedings and subsequent report made it clear that the African participants gave priority to civil and political rights.¹ However, these rights received less and less attention in the 1960's. Until the mid-1970's, emphasis was placed on the right to development and efforts were directed mainly against the white minority-dominated regimes in southern Africa and in Portugal's African empire. The OAU charter acknowledged the importance of human rights as defined by the United Nations, but this received little more than lip service.

By the mid-1970's, Africans had begun to realize that their weak economic performance could not be blamed entirely on global market structures (or the lack of them). In February, 1979, after two decades of independence, a symposium on Africa's development needs reported "Africa in particular is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-being."² Africa's per capita income, \$365, is the lowest in the world. The infant mortality

¹International Commission of Jurists, *African Conference on the Rule of Law: Lagos, Nigeria, January 3-7, 1961. A Report on the Proceedings of the Conference* (Geneva, Switzerland, 1961).

²Leon Dash, "African Summit: A Facing Up to Reality," *The Washington Post*, July 24, 1979.

rate, 137 per 1,000 born, is the highest in the world. Health care is very poor; there is only one doctor per 26,000 rural farmers. African delegates to the July, 1979, OAU summit meeting told one Western reporter that they ascribed the continent's limited development since the 1960's to "narrow nationalisms" and "a weak history of protecting human rights."

The realization that development and human rights are intertwined and disappointment with the first generation of independence have led to a renewed debate on human rights in black Africa. Until the July, 1979, OAU summit, the debate was carried on at private and regional meetings. Church groups, private institutes and human rights nongovernmental organizations played a key role in promoting this dialogue. A parallel effort was taking place through and with the help of the United Nations.

KHARTOUM 1975

In 1975, the All Africa Conference of Churches gathered clergy, lay persons and jurists at Khartoum to review human rights problems.³ The participants minced few words. They placed the burden of the blame squarely on the shoulders of black Africa's own leaders and elites. African leaders were criticized for their penchant to become leaders for life and for their resort to authoritarian rule. Elites were criticized for devoting their time and energies to self-aggrandizement without much consideration for the development needs of the wider population. All were accused of neglecting the real needs of Africa's countries.

Conference participants also pointed out that during colonial rule the more democratic aspects of traditional African societies had been stifled. Colonialism was seen as a source of the penchant for authoritarianism. But the Khartoum conference refused to accept the explanation that colonialism was the only reason for this violation of human rights. Africans were also held to blame.

TANZANIA 1976

In 1976, the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists, in collaboration with the government of Tanzania, held a seminar on human rights and the single-party state at Dar-es-Salaam. Jurists, politicians, bureaucrats and lawyers from eight English-speaking African states attended. Among the important notes struck at the seminar were the ac-

knowledge that human rights have a legitimate place in the single-party state and that these rights are identified in the International Bill of Human Rights.

The Dar-es-Salaam seminar stressed the fact that fundamental rights were consistent with the goals and methods of single-party states, although there are times when individual rights may have to be subordinated to "furthering the rights of the community or group to which the individual belongs." They recognized that "[w]hen this does happen, the fullest possible safeguards should be provided to avoid undue hardship to the individual" and undue abuses of the individual's rights.⁴

Among the general conclusions issued at the end of the seminar is a statement that "human rights include both individual and collective rights," and that "the establishment and maintenance of civil and political rights must go hand in hand with the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights."⁵

By definition, one-party states restrict the right to assembly and freedom of speech. A Zambian lawyer at the Dar-es-Salaam seminar observed that experience does not support the "argument that a one-party state encourages free debate in Parliament."⁶ The Dar-es-Salaam University Vice Chancellor attempted to address these issues in his keynote address by calling on one-party states to educate their people about protecting their rights and to help develop an alert public opinion. His remarks gave rise to heated debate in which some complained that the "all-embracing nature of the [single] party created pressures to conform and people became apathetic or reluctant to speak their minds." Participants called upon single parties to create an ethos "in which the individual can challenge authority without being labelled as a dissident or maltreated by party functionaries at [the] local level."⁷

In its final conclusions, the seminar supported freedom of the press, recognized that in a single-party state, a nation's press cannot challenge the party's fundamental policies and, therefore, deemed it desirable that foreign newspapers be distributed and available. As for freedom of association, the seminar concluded that only political associations are prohibited. The seminar noted that the right to associate must include the right "not to associate," and that every individual should have an opportunity to join an association where only one of its kind exists.

The seminar participants devoted a considerable amount of time on the abusive use of preventive detention, concluding that a detainee should have access to a lawyer, should be served with a statement of the grounds of his detention, and should have the right to have his case reviewed by a review tribunal within one month (or longer if the detainee requires more time to prepare the case).⁸

In general, the seminar recognized that a single-

³All Africa Conference of Churches, *Structures of Injustice: A Report of a Consultation on Violations of Human Rights* (Nairobi, Kenya, 1975).

⁴International Commission of Jurists, *Human Rights in a One-Party State* (London: Search Press, 1978), p. 123.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 122-3.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 114.

party regime may have to give greater attention to the protection of human rights. In Tanzania and Zambia (single-party states), an ombudsman mechanism has been established precisely for this reason as a way to ensure limits on the exercise of administrative powers.

The Tanzanian ombudsman mechanism is the Permanent Commission of Inquiry (PCE) instituted in 1966. Its annual reports indicate that it is a highly respected institution to which citizens are turning in increasingly larger numbers. In the period 1975-1976 a record 3,100 cases were registered with the PCE. In 250 cases, complaints were judged to be well-founded and appropriate action was taken. Almost half these complaints were against the judiciary, the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁹

The Zambian ombudsman is the Office of the Commission for Investigations headed by an Investigator-General. The office was created in 1973 and began to function in fall, 1974. The office receives more and more complaints each year. The number jumped from 183 in 1975 to 700 in 1977. Here too, popular reaction has been very favorable.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: BUTARE AND DAKAR, 1978

In 1978, two separate meetings were held in Africa on human rights and economic development, in July at Butare, Rwanda, and in September at Dakar, Senegal. These meetings included economists as well as lawyers and jurists, and both resulted in strong statements favoring a wider debate on human rights in Africa and the importance of respect for these rights for the achievement of development. At both, the participants rejected any suggestion that development could be advanced by violations of civil and political rights. They stressed the fact that without respect for civil and political rights and the rule of law, development is more difficult to obtain. More than one speaker criticized African rulers who violate human rights and states where the judicial systems do not enjoy real independence. The President of Togo's Supreme Court observed that:

[J]ustice is a universal given. . . . [H]owever constraining economic, social, and cultural conditions may be in Africa, it can never be a matter of sacrificing to them the fundamental principles of rule of law which are a force for progress.¹⁰

⁹International Commission of Jurists, *Report of Follow Up Mission to the Dar es Salaam Seminar*, 1978, p. 16.

¹⁰"Colloque de Dakar sur le Développement et les Droits de l'Homme," *Revue Sénégalaise de Droit*, vol. 11, no. 22 (December, 1977). [This special issue of the *Revue* was published in 1979]; Jan Gorus and Warren Weinstein, *Rapport Général du Colloque sur les Droits de l'Homme et le Développement en Afrique Francophone*, 3-7 Juillet, 1978, Butare [A translation of this report was published by Hurst Hannum in *Universal Human Rights*, vol. 1, 1979].

¹¹Freetown Declaration, mimeo.

In August, 1978, the African Bar Association held its third general meeting at Freetown, where human rights dominated the proceedings, issuing the "Freetown Declaration" on human rights at the end of the sessions. It affirmed that individual human rights are fundamental in Africa, and that individuals have the right to live and be free from arbitrary arrest. Among the freedoms listed as inalienable are freedom of speech and expression, freedom from inhuman treatment, freedom from discrimination on account of religion, race, sex and/or ethnic origin, freedom "to hold property and freedom of assembly, movement and association." The declaration states that when violations of human rights occur in the member states of the African Bar Association, the lawyers should take immediate steps to attract the association's attention to violations. The Freetown Declaration also condemned the flagrant violation of human rights in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and decried the "ill-treatment of political prisoners and opponents in Africa."¹¹

In January, 1979, lawyers from francophone African states met in Dakar. Participants at the Dakar conference emphasized the right of defense. At the 1978 and 1979 meetings held by lawyers and by those devoted to human rights development, concluding statements called for further action by African governments and by the OAU, to promote and protect human rights.

From May 7 to May 17, 1979, Tanzania hosted the Pan-African Conference on Refugees at Arusha. The conference was initiated by the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the meetings were held under the auspices of the OAU, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Participants from more than 38 African states dwelled at length on the fact that Africa has the highest number of refugees in the world and that violations of human rights are a root cause of this situation. Careful attention was also given to the human rights of Africa's three million refugees.

The OAU was asked to reaffirm the commitment of its member states not to reject or expel refugees at the frontier. This is known as the principle of "non-refoulement," according to which an individual should not be compelled to return to or to remain in a territory where that person has reason to fear persecution. The conference report emphasized that refugee legal problems should be viewed in the wider context of respect for human rights. It also recommended that all African states accede to and implement the various human rights instruments adopted within the framework of the United Nations. There was an appeal to create an African center to deal with human rights, refugee law and humanitarian law. African governments were asked to amnesty "their

respective nationals currently in exile, so as to encourage their voluntary repatriation."¹²

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Pressure building up within Africa for direct OAU action on human rights was matched by movement at the United Nations. In March, 1967, Nigeria submitted a draft resolution at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights proposing that member states consider the establishment of human rights commissions in regions where they do not exist. Benin [then Dahomey], Congo [Brazzaville], Senegal and Tanzania were other African states which later co-sponsored the resolution, and it was adopted by 28 in favor, none against and three abstentions (India, the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.).

The Nigerian initiative of 1967 resulted in the creation of a United Nations study group that urged member states to give serious consideration to the idea of regional human rights commissions. Nigeria pushed further, and a special seminar was organized under United Nations auspices in 1969 at Cairo, to discuss the question of an African human rights commission. The results were disappointing. The seminar had sparse attendance and, despite its endorsement of the idea that Africans should create a human rights commission, its suggestions were ignored by the Organization of African Unity.

In April, 1971, a conference of African jurists was convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the OAU. This conference recommended the drafting of an African human rights convention and reiterated the Cairo call for an African human rights commission. In 1973, another United Nations-sponsored meeting was held in Africa at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Twenty-three African states sent representatives, and the participants agreed that the OAU should prepare a human rights charter; but they were divided as to the timeliness of creating an African human rights commission.

At the February-March, 1978, meetings of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Nigeria again introduced a resolution calling upon the United Nations to assist in creating regional human rights institutions. In particular, the resolution called upon the United Nations Secretary-General "to take appropriate steps to give the Organization of African Unity, if it so requests, such assistance as it may require in facilitating the establishment of a regional commission on human rights."¹³ Nigeria was joined by other African states as well as non-African coun-

tries in introducing a similar resolution at the 1979 United Nations General Assembly. Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Swaziland and Zambia joined with Nigeria in offering the resolution that reiterated the request to establish human rights commissions in regions where they do not exist. The draft resolution was adopted by consensus in the Third Committee and Plenary.

Beyond the call for an African human rights commission, or for an African human rights convention, important decisions were taken (within the United Nations Human Rights Commission, at the 1978 Commonwealth summit, and at the 1979 Franco-African Summit in Kigali, Rwanda) to speak out and to call for inquiries into alleged violations of human rights in Africa. In 1978, Africans at the United Nations Human Rights Commission agreed to discuss the situation in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and, albeit with less enthusiasm, in Ethiopia. There had been some discussion of Guinea's human rights record and problems in Malawi and the Central African Empire. The United Nations agreed on a need to undertake an official inquiry into conditions in Uganda and in Equatorial Guinea.

THE AFRICAN RECORD

The concern for human rights in Africa gained momentum, in large part, because of events in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and the former Central African Empire. Although muted, such concern was building in response to the negative political developments in Africa that characterized the 1960's and 1970's.

Military rule, strong personalities, single- or no-party states and critical restrictions on civil or political rights have been pervasive elements of Africa's new states since the year of the Caesars in 1965. In that year, a spate of military coups began which lasted well into the 1970's. The few regimes where multiparty systems and open politics were the rule had dwindled to lonely Botswana and Gambia by the mid-1970's.

Those African leaders who had espoused a variation of humanism in Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia had not matched this concern with political largesse and preferred to retain tight control over social forces within each state. Despite this, in general, Africans fared better in these countries than elsewhere. In most other African states, repression and corruption took a heavy toll, leaving societies teetering on bankruptcy, divided internally and moving backward with respect to economic and social development. In essence, the image projected by the Africa of the early 1970's was one of strife, mismanagement, cruel leadership and self-serving elites. Development goals were not being met, foreign debts were mounting and Africa's masses were worse off than they had been before independence when measured on any scale of quality of life.

¹²AACC Newsletter, vol. 5, no. 6 (June, 1979), pp. 18-21; Pan-African Conference on Refugees, Document REF/AR/CONF/RPT I/Rec. 7.

¹³Commission Human Rights Res. 24 (XXXIV), E/CN.4/1292, p. 132.

The tyrannical and bloody eight years of President Idi Amin's rule in Uganda have been described as a "reign of terror" by human rights organizations like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. From 1971 through 1979, when Amin was toppled, Uganda may have been the worst case of human rights atrocities in the annals of recent African history. Although many Africans were aware of the dimensions of human suffering in Uganda, few spoke out until the very last years of Amin's tenure. In 1975, the OAU selected Amin as its leader and the 1975 OAU Summit was hosted in Kampala. This coincided with fierce attacks on Amin by human rights advocates and some Western regimes.

On June 27, 1975, Botswanan President Sir Seretse Khama announced his government's boycott of the OAU Kampala Summit, sending a message to Addis Ababa to explain the decision. One justification was Seretse Khama's "fears for the personal safety of the members of the [Botswana delegation] . . . should they attend the meeting in Uganda."¹⁴

More to the point, Khama wrote:

The factors which have led to this decision are General Amin's apparent disregard for the sanctity of life, and his exhortation to the armed forces in Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia to overthrow their elected governments, because of their participation in attempts to find a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.¹⁵

Tanzania issued a 2,000 word blunt statement in the same vein, indicating that its government felt obliged to speak out because of the intolerable silence that permitted Amin to continue his misrule with impunity. *Inter alia*, the statement reads:

When massacres, oppression and torture are used by Africans in independent States of Africa there is no protest from anywhere in Africa . . . [W]e are convinced that the Organization of African Unity will deserve the condemnation of the world as an organization of hypocrites if it acquiesces, or appears to acquiesce, in the murders and massacres which have been perpetrated by the present Ugandan Government.¹⁶

Tanzania's Prime Minister added the same day, "In Uganda, several thousand people have lost their lives. For African Heads of Government to go [to Uganda] to a [n OAU] summit is tantamount to giving their blessings to these killings."¹⁷

Zambia joined Tanzania and Botswana in the boycott of the OAU, but these states were in a minority. On the other hand, at the United Nations, the Human Rights Commission and its Subcommittee, both subordinate bodies of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, were reviewing pages of documentation that gave testimony to Amin's

cruelty and the absence of rule of law in Uganda. According to the evidence submitted at the United Nations, an estimated 250,000 people were killed and many thousands fled into exile. The murders were performed with incredible cruelty: victims were tortured, some were even forced to consume their own flesh. Individuals were picked up by Amin's security forces, the most notorious of which were the Public Safety Unit and the State Research Unit. The detainees were never given a modicum of justice; they were either killed shortly after being kidnapped or were dispatched to prison or an interrogation center where they were tortured and then killed. The forces that liberated Uganda found gruesome confirmation of the evidence submitted while Amin was still in power.

A prominent anonymous Ugandan provided the following description of life under Amin:

Arrests without warrant or charge, detention without trial, confiscation of property of Ugandan Africans, beatings which follow every arrest at night and sometimes result in death are the pattern of life in Uganda today. An ordinary worker, professional or businessman leaves his home in the morning to go to work without being sure that he will return home. The whole country is engulfed in fear. A knock on the door may spell the end of the householder. The poor peasants in the villages who are mere caricatures and no threat at all to the regime continue being bundled off in army jeeps or boots of saloon cars [trunks of four-door sedans] and [are] taken to be slaughtered like cattle.¹⁸

Former Foreign Minister Kibedi, Amin's brother-in-law, denounced Amin for entrenching tribalism and wrecking the national economy. Indeed, Amin's initial violation of human rights was the brutal and brusque expulsion of Uganda's Asian community, including Asians with Ugandan nationality. Amin's move was well received initially because Ugandans believed that this gross violation would rebound to the benefit of the indigenous economy. This did not prove to be the case. Shops and services provided by Asians were not replaced by well-managed Ugandan outlets, middlemen or skilled professionals. In April, 1979, when Amin was toppled, Uganda's economy was in shockingly dire straits.

(Continued on page 130)

Warren Weinstein is the director of the Coordinating Council for International Issues, a non-profit research and cultural exchange organization in Washington, D.C., and Rockville, Maryland. He recently testified on human rights in Africa before the House Subcommittee on Africa and International Organization, and completed a trip to west and central Africa to discuss human rights and review development problems. He completed a study of African attitudes toward human rights with funding from the United States State Department Office of External Research.

¹⁴International Commission of Jurists, *Uganda and Human Rights* (Geneva, Switzerland, 1977), p. 165.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 27.

"The greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of most of the people in the underdeveloped world is rampant population growth. However, about 80 percent of Africa's population live in countries where there is no official policy to limit population growth; and in fact, a few countries encourage population growth."

Population Growth and Urbanization in Africa

BY YOHANNIS ABATE

Assistant Professor of African American Studies, University of Maryland Baltimore County

THE 1979 population of Africa, estimated as 457 million, is about 10.6 percent of the world population.¹ Many factors explain the sparseness of the population of Africa. About one-third of the continent is desert or semidesert, the major deserts being the Sahara, the Namib and Kalahari and parts of the Horn of Africa, where the environment forbids population concentration. A large part of the equatorial region of Africa is hot and rainy, with dense forest and leached soils, and is therefore not attractive to human habitation. Diseases have taken their toll in reducing both the human and animal population. The tsetse fly has for years rendered a large but potentially productive part of Africa inhospitable and the locust has devastated large tracts of crop land. Slavery and colonialism have depopulated large parts of Africa. Other limiting factors include inter-tribal conflicts, the spread of venereal disease, and the introduction of European diseases like influenza, against which Africans had not developed immunity.

In addition, the population of Africa is very unevenly distributed. Although there are large tracts of land in Africa that are uninhabitable, there are also pockets of dense concentration. In West Africa, the Guinea coastlands and northern Nigeria, and in East Africa, the Ethiopian plateau, Rwanda and Burundi and the East African highlands, support very high densities of population. In South Africa, the mineral rich area of Southern Transvaal and the coastal region of Natal are densely populated. In northern Africa, the Mediterranean coastal region extending from Morocco to Tunisia, and the Nile Valley and delta support some of the highest densities of people in the world. This unevenness in the distribution of population in Africa is also reflected in the great disparity of population among African countries. Of the 50 African countries, only five (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Zaire) have populations over 25 million, and these account for about 45 percent of

Africa's population. Eight African countries have populations of 10 million to 20 million, about 27 percent of Africa's population. Twelve African countries, or about one-fourth of Africa's states, are what may be referred to as "mini-states," with less than 1 million people each.

With the exception of Ethiopia and Somalia, censuses have been taken in many African countries. However, even in states where censuses have been taken there are data deficiencies, because of illiteracy, the shortage of trained enumerators, lack of funds and accurate enumeration maps, problems of transportation and communication, the absence of birth or death records, suspicion on the part of respondents that census figures might be used to assess heavier taxes, and deliberate distortions that are societally or politically motivated. However, there have been many improvements in African census figures as governments recognize the need for reliable data for purposes of economic planning.

The crude birthrate for Africa in 1979 was 46 per 1,000 compared to a world average of 28, and 15 for North America. About one-third of all African countries have birthrates between 48 and 51, among the highest in the world. African countries with the lowest birthrates are Egypt, 38; Tunisia, 36; and Gabon, 33. Egypt and Tunisia have slowed their birthrates because they have introduced family planning programs. The low birthrate in Gabon is attributed to poor health conditions. The small islands off the coast of Africa—Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles—have effective family planning programs, and this has reduced their birthrates to about 26 per 1,000, or about half that of many African countries.

Among the factors that encourage high fertility in Africa are early marriage and the high percentage of women who marry. The marriage age for most African women is between 13 and 18, which gives them a reproductive span of about 30 years. Other factors encouraging high fertility include the availability of basic health services and the eradication of diseases like malaria. Many Africans want large fami-

¹Unless indicated otherwise, population data for 1979 was taken from: Population Reference Bureau (PRB), *1979 World Population Data Sheet*, 1979.

lies because they fear that not all children will survive; children are regarded as old age security. The average fertility rate (number of children born per woman) is about 6.5, ranging from about 3 in a few areas like Gabon to over 8 in many parts of Africa.²

The annual death rate is 17 per 1,000 people in Africa, compared to a world average of 11, and 9 for North America. This is the highest death rate in the world, but there is a great deal of variation in the rate of mortality in Africa. Fifteen of the 55 countries in Africa for which data is available have death rates of over 20 per 1,000 annually, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad. The last five countries are located in the Sahel,* where drought between 1968 and 1974 claimed the lives of thousands of people; so many people were weakened by the drought that its effect in terms of mortality may continue for a few more years.³

The drought in Ethiopia during 1969-1973 and the civil war there have claimed thousands of lives. Mortality rates averaging 19 per 1,000 in West Africa, 20 in middle Africa, 18 in eastern Africa, 11 in southern Africa and 14 in North Africa are the highest death rates for any region in the world. The lowest mortality rates are found in the islands off the east coast of Africa—Mauritius, 8; Reunion, 6; and Seychelles, 8. Tunisia and Egypt also have death rates of 10 and 12 respectively, the lowest rates on the African mainland.

High mortality rates are directly related to infant mortality and life expectancy at birth. Infant mortality (the number of infants who die before their first year per 1,000 live births) is 143 for Africa, compared to 95 for the world and 14 for North America. West Africa has the highest rate, with 158; 165 for middle Africa; 127 for North Africa; 138 for eastern Africa and 96 for southern Africa. The lowest rates are found in the islands off the coast of Africa in Mauritius, 46; Reunion, 41; and Seychelles, 43. Even the "low" rates in Africa are three to four times the infant mortality rates of the industrialized countries.

Life expectancy at birth is 47 for Africa compared to 60 for the world, and 73 for North America. The high death rate in Africa is explained by the prevalence of epidemics, famine and a host of diseases like malaria, yellow fever, bilharziasis, trypanosomiasis and tuberculosis. These diseases are fatal in themselves; but the physical weakness produced by under-

nutrition and malnutrition reduces immunity to these diseases considerably. The shortage of health and medical facilities and the inadequate living conditions contribute to raising the death rate in African countries, which is more than twice the death rate in the industrialized countries and Latin America.

FOOD SUPPLY

An important factor associated with population growth is food supply. Food production in Africa has not kept pace with population growth; thus some African countries that were self-sufficient in food in the 1950's have become net importers of food in the 1970's, in large part because of the subsistence nature of African agriculture. African agriculture, which is inefficient with low yields, suffers from problems of land tenure, primitive technology, and the absence of storage, credit, marketing and transportation facilities.

Food is also in short supply in Africa because the growth of cash crops was encouraged during the colonial period; after independence, many African countries followed the colonial pattern of development because the cash crops provide needed foreign currency for the importation of capital goods.⁴ Until recently, many African countries stressed industrialization rather than agriculture, which provides the means of livelihood for most of Africa's people. The shortage of food is compounded by natural calamities, like the recurring drought in the Sahel and in eastern Africa. The lack of food causes the physical disability and low performance of African workers and explains their susceptibility to infectious diseases. Thus African countries must concentrate on integrated rural development with an initial focus on food self-sufficiency. This will not only alleviate the food shortage, but may stem the tide of migration to the cities and provide the foundation for industrial development.

About 44 percent of Africa's population is less than 15 years old and only 3 percent of the population is over 64 years old. The adult population is therefore about 53 percent of the population. A ratio of those under 15 years of age plus those over 64 years to the adult population (between 16 and 64 years) gives the dependency ratio, which usually provides an index of the strain of population growth on economic development. Africa's dependency ratio is 47:53, which means that there are 89 dependents for every 100 persons in the working age group. The situation is even worse in a few African countries. In nine African countries, between 47 and 49 percent of the population is less than 15 years old. In these countries, the dependent population actually outnumbers the adult population. In the more industrialized countries of West Europe, the proportion of population under 15 years of age is only 22 percent (or half that of Africa), while only 14 percent of their people are over 64 (or

*The lands bordering the southern rim of the Sahara Desert.

²PRB, *Intercom*, vol. 7, no. 10 (October, 1979), p. 3, and J.I. Clarke, *Population Geography and the Developing Countries* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1971), p. 103.

³E. Berg, *The Recent Economic Evolution of the Sahel* (Ann Arbor: Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1975).

⁴G.A. Borgstrom, *The Food and People Dilemma* (Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1974). See also Borgstrom, *Too Many* (New York: Macmillan, 1969, and *The Hungry Planet*, *op cit*, 1971.

over four times that of Africa), and adults comprise about 64 percent of the total population. A country with a very young population must spend a large proportion of its resources on schools and health facilities, resources that could otherwise be used to improve living standards and thus break the vicious cycle of poverty.

EDUCATION

It is generally believed that healthy and educated children are a country's most important resource, but both the health and the education of African children are far below that of their contemporaries in the industrialized world. Of children between 6 and 17 years old in Africa, about 41 percent attend school, compared to a world average of 60 percent, and 89 percent in the more industrialized countries.⁵ While southern Africa has over 50 percent literacy in the 6-17 year age group, the figure is much lower for the rest of Africa, ranging from 45 percent in North Africa to about 30 percent in West Africa. School enrollments are so low because facilities, teachers and teaching materials are inadequate. Girls are less literate than boys. Most of the school-age children live in rural areas, where access to education and health facilities is even more difficult than in urban areas. School-age children suffer malnutrition, which kills some and damages others permanently. The human brain reaches 90 percent of its normal development in the first four years of life. During this critical period, the brain is highly vulnerable to nutritional deficiencies, which can cause as much as a 25-percent impairment of normal mental ability. Nonetheless, if present population growth rates continue (and indications are that the populations will grow at an even faster pace), by the year 2000 the proportion of the population less than 15 years old will be about 42 percent (or 346 million out of 831 million). This is less than the present 44 percent; because of a lowered mortality rate and an increase in life expectancy there will be proportionally more people older than 15 than there are in 1980. Family planning and improvements in nutrition, health and education may change the picture, so that children are not born into poverty and deprivation.

POPULATION GROWTH RATE

In 1979, Africa's population growth rate was 2.9 percent annually compared to 1.7 percent for the world and 0.7 percent for North America. At this rate, Africa's population is increasing by 13.3 million people annually (out of 73.5 million for the world as a whole) and is projected to reach 831 million by year 2000. The rate of Africa's population growth was stable at 1.5 percent during 1930-1950, and grew 2.3

percent during 1950-1960, 2.4 percent during 1960-1969, 2.6 percent during 1970-1975 and 2.7 percent annually during 1976-1979. The growth rate will probably exceed this figure in the near future, because of the absence of population control programs and the lack of family planning services in many African countries, and the relatively rapid decline in mortality achieved in recent years by many African countries, which have channeled their efforts to the control of disease. In addition, the demographic history of Africa resembles that of Latin America 20 or 30 years ago, when Latin America underwent a similar demographic process.⁶

A comparison of the demographic transition in Africa, Middle America and North America supports this conclusion. In Africa, both birthrate and death rate (46 and 17 per thousand) are high, and population is growing at 2.9 percent. In Middle America, although the birthrate (41) is much lower than Africa's because the death rate (7) is even lower than that of North America, the net growth rate is 3.4 percent annually, the highest in the world. In North America, and the industrialized world, both the birthrate and the death rate are low (15 and 9 respectively), so that the population is growing at only 0.7 percent, and this rate may be declining. Thus, Africa's population will have to go through the second stage of the demographic process of high birthrate and low death rate before the rate of population growth starts declining. Middle America's population is growing at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, and the population is expected to double in 20 years. The average birthrate is 41, but in Honduras and Nicaragua, the birthrate is 47, a figure comparable to many countries in Africa. The death rate in that region is only 12, much lower than in Africa; hence the annual population growth rate is 3.5 and 3.4 percent respectively. Africa's demographic process will have to go through this stage before the growth rate starts to decline.

URBAN GROWTH

Urbanization is the other dimension of the population issue in Africa. Africa is largely a rural continent; only 25 percent of the population is classified as urban population is only 12 percent, like East Africa, or 19 percent, like West Africa, the largest cities of rate of urban growth Africa is among the fastest growing areas. Even those regions of Africa where the urban population is only 12 percent, like East Africa, or 19 percent, like West Africa, the largest cities (which in many cases are also capital cities) are growing very rapidly. A few cities like Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Monrovia, Abidjan, Lagos and Kinshasa are doubling their population every six to ten years. Kinshasa and Lagos, two of Africa's "millionaire" cities, have been growing at an annual rate of 9.7 and

⁵PRB, *Children in the World*, Washington, D.C., 1979.

⁶T.L. McCoy, *The Dynamics of Population in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1974).

8.1 percent respectively between 1950 and 1975, and their rate of growth between 1975 and 2000 is estimated to be 6.2 percent annually.⁷ Both these cities may have populations in excess of 9 million by the year 2000.

An important feature of African urbanism is the degree of primacy. The largest city is usually more than twice the size of the second largest city, and may represent more than one-third of the country's urban population. These cities will probably continue to grow at a rapid pace because they offer a greater share of public services, employment opportunities and better medical and educational facilities. They are major centers of manufacturing activity. Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, with a population of 100,000 in 1970, accounted for all the manufacturing activity in Liberia. Dakar, in Senegal, with a population of about 600,000 in 1970, accounted for 82 percent of all the manufacturing activity in that country. This situation is repeated in all major African cities.⁸ In Kenya, 48 percent of all wholesalers in the country are in Nairobi; and in Ethiopia 48 percent of the doctors, 59 percent of the nurses and 31 percent of the hospital beds in the entire country are in Addis Ababa, the capital city. Cairo and Alexandria together account for 70 percent of all factories and factory workers in Egypt and for half the capital invested in the country.

Because of this concentration of opportunities, the largest African cities are sometimes referred to as "parasitic" as opposed to "generative."⁹ Although many African governments lament this uneven distribution of economic development, very few have been able to change the pattern. Some Africans argue that economic benefits will gradually spill over from the cities into surrounding areas, and others favor a decentralization of employment, educational and other facilities to smaller towns so that economic development will reach a larger population.¹⁰

⁷United Nations Population Division, "Trends and Prospects in Population in Urban Agglomerations, 1950-2000 as Assessed in 1973-1975," ESA/P/WP, vol. 54, 1975.

⁸A.L. Mabogunje "Manufacturing and the Geography of Development in Tropical Africa" *Economic Geography*, vol. 49, 1973, p. 11.

⁹B.F. Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 3, 1954, pp. 278-294.

¹⁰B.J.L. Berry, "Hierarchical Diffusion: The Basis of Developmental Filtering and Spread in a System of Growth Centers" in *Man, Space, and Environment: Concepts in Contemporary Human Geography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 340-359.

¹¹R.R. Brand, "The Urban Housing Challenge" in C.G. Knight and J.C. Newman, eds., *Contemporary Africa: Geography and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 324.

¹²World Bank, *World Bank Atlas: Population, Per Capita Product and Growth Rate* (Washington, D.C., 1972) and World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, D.C., 1978).

¹³R.S. MacNamara (World Bank), *Address to the University of Notre Dame* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1969).

The components of rapid African urban growth are natural population increase and migration, especially from rural areas. It is estimated that overall urban growth in Africa was 5.4 percent annually between 1950 and 1960, while cities with populations over 100,000 were growing at an average annual rate of 8.6 percent in the same period. Population growth during the period was 2.1 percent; therefore urban growth because of migration was 3.3 percent annually. Many factors "push" people out of the rural areas, including rural poverty induced by population pressure, soil exhaustion, land tenure problems, and environmental factors like drought, famine and disease. The other side of the migration component is the "pull" of the city, where there are real or imagined opportunities for a better life. Various voluntary and ethnic associations acclimatize a few of the new migrants, who in a few months provide a base for another set of migrants.

The consequences of the heavy influx of migrants into the cities have been severe in the areas of housing, employment, health, transportation and education. It was estimated that, in 1969, 40 percent of Nairobi's population, 30 percent of Dakar's population and 30-35 percent of Accra's population lived in slums and shantytowns.¹¹ African governments are short of funds to alleviate urban poverty; they have not fully committed themselves to solving their urban problems, beset as they are with other problems that appear to defy short-run solutions. Nigeria and Tanzania are planning to move their capital cities to more central locations; Malawi has already done so. Whether this will lessen the pressure on the largest cities remains to be seen. Attempts to decentralize economic activity by relocating industries away from the major cities is a realistic solution, but this policy is very difficult to implement.

THE NEED FOR A POPULATION POLICY

During the 1960's, more than 20 African countries had per capita gross national products (GNP) growing at the rate of over 3 percent annually, while their populations were growing at the rates of 2 to 3 percent annually.¹² On the other hand, some African countries actually experienced a net decline in their GNP growth rates. There were countries where half the economic gain was absorbed by population growth, and countries where the economic gain was fully absorbed by population growth.

The 1970's saw a decline in the overall rate of economic growth, while the population growth rate increased, because governments had to divert a high proportion of their limited national savings away from productive investment to maintain a low level of existence. The greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of most of the people in the underdeveloped world is rampant population growth.¹³ However, about 80 percent of Africa's popu-

lation live in countries where there is no official policy to limit population growth; and in fact, a few countries encourage population growth.

Overpopulation is not the only issue that plays havoc with African economic development. Other factors include the structure of the economy itself, the undue reliance on agricultural exports that perennially suffer from adverse terms of trade, the heavy dependence on one or two agricultural or mineral products, the neocolonial economic linkage, political instability which discourages foreign investment, unrealistic and poorly designed programs of economic development and inequitable land-tenure systems. The economic picture is made worse by calamities like drought, famine and wars.

One argument in support of a large population in Africa is its potential in unexplored resources. While Africa's potential resources are immense, the realization of that potential requires heavy investment in social and physical infrastructure. The economy of African countries has been growing at less than impressive rates. Africa's per capita gross national product in 1979 was US \$450, the lowest of any continent; in fact, 38 African countries have per capita gross national products of less than \$450, the average for these countries being about US \$240. Only 6 African countries have passed the \$1,000 mark while the world average is about \$1,800. Other measurements like the index for the Physical Quality of Life (PQLI) do not paint a brighter picture of Africa's socioeconomic development.¹⁴ This index measures quality of life without using economic figures. Instead, life expectancy at age 1, the infant mortality rate and the literacy rate are added to arrive at a composite figure from 0 (low) to 100 (high). PQLI does not necessarily correlate with a high GNP per capita, especially in countries where national income has not been translated into improvement of the living standards of the people. Using the PQLI, Africa ranks lowest, with an average figure of 33, compared to 58 for Asia and 71 for Latin America.¹⁵ Unrestrained population growth, therefore, will continue to sap the economic potential of African countries.

The population density in many parts of rural Africa has been increasing at a considerable rate. The consequence has been too much pressure on the land, and the carrying capacity of the land (under the prevailing rudimentary agricultural system) has been stretched to the limit. This has led to soil exhaustion;

the continuous cultivation of the land prevents the soil from replenishing itself. Other consequences of the overcrowding of rural land are low yield, soil erosion, overgrazing, the cutting of trees for fuel and housing. These have a cumulative effect on the long-term climate of a region like the Sahel, through the albedo effect. This is the amount of the sun's radiation that is reflected back from the land surface, which changes if the land has lost its vegetative cover. Deterioration of the agricultural land has usually induced its inhabitants to move to other localities in search of new opportunities. Albedo effects have been recorded in Ghana, Rwanda and Burundi. One of the consequences of these deteriorating environmental conditions has been the failure of food production to keep pace with population growth; in more than two-fifths of the African countries, there have been actual declines in per capita food production. Part of the food deficit is being met through imports; by the early 1970's, African nations were spending about \$350 million a year to import food grains.

POOR PROSPECTS

The prospects for increased food production through the introduction of new scientifically tested seeds with very high yields, like the green revolution, received a severe setback during the Arab oil embargo of 1973. The miracle seeds that give increased yields call for fertilizers, pesticides and heavy irrigation that need a large capital outlay.¹⁶ Without the application of fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation, the yield was even lower than the yield with the original familiar seed. The old seeds are more resistant to many kinds of plant disease and grow without a heavy application of fertilizers and irrigation water. In the absence of capital outlays the farmer has been forced to go back to his time-tested, reliable, low-yielding seeds and methods.

The Malthusian prediction with respect to food and population may not be too far off target in many African countries; witness the recent drought and famine in the Sahel zone, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. A few African governments recognized the seriousness of the population question and have vigorously introduced family planning programs.¹⁷ But as of 1979, only six African countries have officially declared that they plan to reduce the rate of popu-

(Continued on page 132)

¹⁴M.D. Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, Pergamon Press, 1979).

¹⁵PRB, *1979 World Population Data Sheet*, 1979.

¹⁶L.R. Brown, *Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970's* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

¹⁷PRB, *World Population Growth and Response* (Washington, D.C., 1976).

Yohannis Abate specializes in the population and political geography of Africa. He has published several articles on population and on the Horn of Africa in African studies and geography journals. His latest publication is a chapter, "Secessionism and Irredentism in Ethiopia," in Raymond L. Hall, ed., *Ethnic Autonomy: Comparative Dynamics* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).

"As Rhodesia moves into the 1980's, it is by no means certain that the crisis has ended. Some observers believe Rhodesia has only entered the quiet eye of the storm."

The Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia

By RICHARD W. HULL

Associate Professor of African History, New York University

IN December, 1979, the world was stunned to learn that an independent nation in Africa had voted to return to colonial status. After 14 years of self-declared independence, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia lowered its flag, raised the British Union Jack and welcomed the return of an English governor endowed with near dictatorial powers. Unbelievably, British imperial rule had returned to Central Africa. Equally astounding, this occurred with the approval of the fervently anti-imperialist neighboring African nations and the guerrillas who had been fighting a bitter war of liberation for almost seven years.

These historically unprecedented acts were a response to a tentative agreement reached in early December at the Lancaster House conference in London, the ninth attempt at a settlement in nearly a decade of on-again off-again negotiations among the British, the white-dominated Rhodesian government, and the two liberation movements—the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union. The Western press attributed the apparent success of the conference to the tough, skillful diplomacy of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her foreign secretary, Lord Carrington. In reality, it was the denouement of a process that forced blood enemies to compromise their long-cherished principles and to accept the return of the imperialist master. The Thatcher government merely seized the right moment in history to take a bold new initiative.

What are the elements of the peace? The British-designed Lancaster House constitution provides for a President, elected to a six-year term by two houses of Parliament. The President will appoint all Cabinet ministers, including a Prime Minister. He will be empowered to appoint heads of the armed forces and police and members of the High Court and the Public Service Commission. The presidency will be strong, though it must share power with a legislative branch holding more than rubber-stamp responsibilities. Parliament will consist of a 40-seat Senate with power to delay, not block, legislation and a more significant House of Assembly with 100 seats. Eighty of the House members will be chosen by the nation's total electorate; to protect European interests, only whites will choose 10 of the 40 Senators and 20 of the 100

members of the Assembly. In the first seven years after independence, reserved white seats in both bodies can only be eliminated by unanimous vote of the Assembly. And all other constitutional amendments will require an affirmative vote by 70 of the 100 Assemblymen.

If adhered to, this constitution will maintain whites in a strong political position in an independent Zimbabwe. The British intended this, hoping to prevent a white flight, like the white exodus in neighboring Mozambique when (on independence) nearly a quarter of a million Portuguese stampeded out of the country, leaving behind a radical Marxist government and an economy in shambles.

The Zimbabwe constitution will not become effective until a cease-fire is reached and British-supervised elections are held. In the intervening transition period, intended to last 11 weeks, the British governor, Christopher Soames, has overall responsibility for administering the country. He and a handful of British civil servants together with a skeleton peace-keeping force of some 1,200 Commonwealth troops drawn from Kenya and elsewhere are entrusted with the seemingly impossible task of stabilizing a war-torn country half the size of Texas. They must work in concert with the mainly white-officered Rhodesian security forces and with a joint commission of the military commanders of the Patriotic Front's ZIPRA and ZANLA armies.

To understand how the various parties to this continuing crisis reached an agreement that seems so unfavorable to everyone, particularly to the guerrillas, one must examine the political, economic and human situation in Rhodesia and neighboring states in 1979. The seven-year civil war claimed more than 25,000 lives, mostly innocent African civilians under the age of 15. It drove productive peasants off their farms and created an enormous refugee problem, not only for Rhodesia but even more for neighboring Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, who collectively had to feed and provide clothing and shelter for over a quarter of a million people. The Red Cross alone was spending more than \$300,000 monthly to feed the refugees. Inside Rhodesia, refugees crowded into the cities; in Salisbury, the capital, vast squatter settlements of nearly 60,000 unemployed, uprooted,

malnourished and frustrated victims were living uncomfortably close to the once secure white suburbs. Many white farmers abandoned their estates, especially in the fertile eastern region near Mozambique, and headed for Salisbury or south of the border. The farmers left behind faced increasing guerrilla intimidation of their black farmworkers, kidnappings, maimings, and land-mined roads.

In early, February, 1979, 90 percent of the country was placed under martial law, but most of the fighting and dying occurred in the Tribal Trust Lands containing 80 percent of the black population. It was becoming painfully clear that the government's program of placing rural populations in protected villages could not restore the security so necessary for normal productive life.

As the year progressed, veterinary control began to break down in African rural areas, and increasing numbers of cattle died from tsetse infection, foot-and-mouth disease, or tick-borne diseases. The death of more than a half million African-owned cattle had a demoralizing effect on the people, whose social, economic and religious lives centered on their herds. Medical care also became a casualty of the conflict; by March, 1979, 155 of the country's 450 African hospitals had closed because they lacked supplies and security.

Security for whites was also breaking down. Almost everywhere outside the urban areas, long-distance travel had to be protected by armed convoy. In February, for the first time guerrillas attacked Salisbury International Airport. Although the airport was not damaged, the attack proved that the guerrillas were capable of attacking the country's most vulnerable points. In the same month, a Rhodesian airliner was downed by a Soviet-made SAM-7 ground-to-air missile, killing 58 passengers, mostly civilians.

All parties to the Rhodesian conflict had escalated the war to dangerous levels. In Salisbury, Abel T. Muzorewa and Ndabaning Sithole formed private armies that roamed the streets like Haiti's old tonton-macoutes. In February, white-piloted Rhodesian planes raided a Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) guerrilla camp 185 miles inside Angola in the deepest penetration of an independent African nation since the civil war began. They also bombarded Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) camps more than 150 miles within neighboring Mozambique.

But the war was draining the treasury, consuming more than \$850,000 daily, and was expected to cost the government more than a half billion dollars in fiscal 1979. The government found itself extracting larger loans from its increasingly impoverished citizens and from external, mainly South African, sources. Tourism, once a major earner of foreign

exchange, had all but collapsed. Overall, the economy suffered a 3.6 percent decline in real gross domestic product in 1978 and the downward spiral was expected to accelerate. Unemployment exceeded 20 percent. Most experts agreed that living standards had fallen at least 25 percent over the last four years, as imports became more difficult to obtain and more costly. White emigration continued unabated, reaching more than 2,500 in the first quarter of 1979 and amounting to more than 40,000 over the last three years. Whites were outnumbered 26 to 1.

As the guerrilla war escalated, the government was forced to expand its own forces and increasingly to turn to Africans for recruits. The military establishment had ballooned; by mid-1979 it consisted of 22,000 regulars, draftees and reservists, 8,000 paramilitary British South Africa (BSA) police, 35,000 police reserves, and at least 10,000 auxiliaries. Secretly, South Africa sent in several thousand of its own men to protect the rail line, bridges and road routes carrying supplies between Rhodesia and South Africa.

Many whites were troubled by the fact that more than 85 percent of the men defending them were Africans—some close relatives of the guerrillas—and that real power in the country was subtly passing from the civilian to the military, under the absolute control of Lieutenant General Peter Walls. Clearly, the war was bankrupting the country, morally and financially, and had to be concluded soon. In desperation, white Rhodesians created the structure and outward appearance of black majority rule, pinning their hopes on an end to the international economic boycott and to the beginning of diplomatic recognition. This was the intention of Ian Smith's 1978 internal agreement with the moderate African nationalists.

The white Rhodesians went a step further in January, 1979, when they overwhelmingly approved a new internally designed constitution providing for a transition to majority rule. But the constitution unabashedly favored the whites, reserving for them 28 of 100 legislative seats for a decade and leaving the control of the courts, military, and civil service in their hands. Under that constitution, at least six white votes would have been needed in the House to amend an entrenched clause. Africans were excluded from voting on the constitution, which was therefore endorsed by less than one percent of the nation.

Nevertheless, in the national elections held in April, Muzorewa's party won 67 percent of the votes cast, and gained 51 of the 72 African seats in the 100-member House. Even more astounding, 64 percent of the country's eligible black voters went to the polls in one of the freest elections of the decade in Africa. A majority of more than 200 Western observers, including black American civil rights leaders, reported favorably on the conduct and results of the elections.

There was euphoria in Salisbury—a belief that at last the world would recognize the legitimacy of the government and would lift economic sanctions. But this proved to be very naive. Initially, the elections gave fresh impetus to the pro-Rhodesian lobbies in Washington and London. In early May, the U.S. Senate voted 75 to 19 to adopt a “sense of the Congress” resolution declaring the Rhodesian election free and asking an end to sanctions. In late May, a British Conservative party report—the Boyd report—stated that Rhodesia’s electoral machinery was fairly conducted and that the election was as free as possible under the circumstances and reflected the wishes of the majority of the country’s electorate. Even Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, the head of the front-line states, was impressed by the African turnout. At that time, United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance flew to London and said that the British and Americans must face a “new reality” in Rhodesia.

But then came crucial setbacks. The regime’s desperate search for international recognition suffered a blow in early May when the new Parliament opened in the face of a 12-seat boycott by Reverend Sithole’s party. Sithole’s showing in the April elections had been unexpectedly poor and he had responded by calling them “rigged.” Then, Great Britain and the United States came under enormous diplomatic pressure from Nigeria and other Commonwealth nations to disclaim the election results. It is worth noting that, by the time of the elections, 15 percent of America’s oil imports came from Nigeria, at a time when oil supplies from Iran were declining precipitously. Nigeria sent warnings to Great Britain and the United States that it might retaliate with oil suspension if they dared to recognize the Muzorewa regime or to lift economic sanctions.

President Jimmy Carter yielded to the pressure, and on June 7 he announced to a surprised Congress that economic sanctions would not be lifted because, in his view, the April elections were neither “free nor fair.” Another blow to Muzorewa’s regime came days later; his party was reduced from 51 to 43 seats in the House when vice chairman James Chikerema and seven members of Parliament broke to form a new party. This move destroyed Muzorewa’s legislative majority and made him appear more dependent than ever before on Ian Smith’s 28-seat bloc. No one outside the country seemed impressed when the state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was proclaimed on June 1 and Muzorewa succeeded Ian Smith as the nation’s first black Prime Minister. The world was not convinced that real power had passed to the Africans, even though African majority rule had been achieved constitutionally through national multiracial elections.

Muzorewa flew to Washington, D.C., in early July, but at Camp David he was unable to convince Presi-

dent Carter to lift sanctions. And the powerful international business community in oil-rich Texas was more intent on a Houston visit by ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, who pledged an intensification of the war if sanctions were lifted.

At the annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the 49-nation group also warned Great Britain and the United States against repealing sanctions. Nigeria had already cut its oil exports to Britain by half and had expelled the giant British Petroleum to show it meant business in its position on liberation in southern Africa.

The British and Americans again urged their old plan for an all-parties conference. Robert Mugabe, the ZANU leader, would agree to another meeting only if the Patriotic Front forces were given a predominant role in the army and police in the proposed transitional regime. And Ian Smith, whose party had won all 28 reserved white parliamentary seats, refused to modify the internal settlement he had worked out with Muzorewa.

The Anglo-American initiative had failed again, and there was a real fear that the Patriotic Front might turn to the Soviet bloc for military support. In February, East German President Erich Honecker had visited three of the front-line states and had signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Marxist Angola. And after the April elections in Rhodesia, Marxist Ethiopia, a Soviet ally, stepped up its training of Patriotic Front forces. Moreover, Patriotic Front forces were swarming into Rhodesia and were estimated to number over 17,000 by mid-year.

Muzorewa’s position looked hopeless. The internal settlement had failed. Muzorewa had failed to convince the world that his regime represented the wishes of the people; he had failed to consolidate the various internal parties under him; and he had failed to gain diplomatic recognition from a single nation. To make matters worse, under a compromise adopted in July, the United States Congress agreed that sanctions would be lifted on November 15, unless President Carter determined it was not in the “national interest” to do so.

More devastating to Muzorewa’s government was
(Continued on page 133)

Richard W. Hull has traveled extensively in Africa since 1961 under a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and grants from the New York State Department of Education and New York University. In 1974, he wrote, produced, and narrated for CBS television a 47-part series entitled “African Civilizations,” which was broadcast in this country, Canada, and Africa. He is the author of numerous books, including *Modern Africa: Change and Continuity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), *African Cities and Towns before the European Conquest* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976).

"The Sahara is probably the best example today of a situation in which United States military involvement, direct or indirect, would bring negative consequences to American global interests without resolving the local African conflict. Coordinated African, Arab, American, French and Spanish pressure on Morocco, Algeria and Polisario for negotiation would contribute to a peaceful solution and to the eventual development of this region, affiliated in some way with Morocco."

The Western Sahara

By BRIAN WEINSTEIN

Professor of Political Science, Howard University

FOR years, the Western Sahara was a "terra nullius" or land not worth worrying about, much like the New Hebrides islands in the Pacific Ocean. A largely nomadic population spread thinly over about 110,000 square miles of sand, brush and oases attracted little attention. Spanish control continuing into the 1970's went more or less unnoticed by scholars and political leaders, who wrote and spoke as if the colonial chapter had closed in West and North Africa except for Portuguese-controlled Guinea. True, after the mid-1960's the United Nations General Assembly began to call for self-determination, but colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa held the spotlight. Today, battles between Moroccan armed forces and the Algerian-supported Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) for control of this New Zealand-sized land once known as the Spanish Sahara have brought it into focus.

Each party to this increasingly intense conflict waves the banner of decolonization, liberation and self-determination. For Moroccans, the absorption of the Sahara represents another step in the long process of restitution of the national homeland seized in bits and pieces by Spain and France in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Polisario maintains that the Spanish colonizers created a new people, the Sahrawi, and the outlines of a new state, the Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic, which has as much right to an independent identity as the huge Nigeria or the minuscule Sao Tome and Principe, similarly created by Europeans. Algeria says it supports Polisario for the same reasons it has trained and helped equip southern African organizations, to wit, because it is a genuine African liberation movement. Therefore, Algeria and Libya arm Polisario, train its soldiers, and provide safe havens near Tindouf that permit the Sahrawis to conduct sorties into the Sahara and into pre-1975 Morocco proper. Algerian diplomatic activity on behalf of Polisario at the meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and elsewhere—while Morocco has tended to shun such effort—has been invaluable for the movement.

The promise of economic benefits also spurs each actor on because recently developed rich phosphate mines offer attractive rewards. Offshore fishing and other resources like iron ore and possibly oil make the Western Sahara increasingly valuable. Its location on the northwestern Atlantic coast of Africa between Morocco and Mauritania is important for its neighbors and for Algeria, whose city of Tindouf with its own iron ore reserves is close to the frontier it shares with Western Sahara. Although this border is one of the shortest between any two countries, it is adequate for the construction of a railroad or a road that could ensure the exploitation of the iron.

The location of the Western Sahara is also important for Morocco, whose leaders fear that if an independent Sahrawi state fell under the control of anti-Moroccan forces like the Algerians, Morocco would be cut off geographically from land communication with the rest of Africa. Moroccans assume that Polisario would remain closely allied with Algeria, with which Morocco has already gone to war. In the past, Mauritania saw the Sahara as a buffer between itself and an expanding Morocco, but its current role is minor. In sum, economic considerations, a long simmering competition between Morocco and Algeria, competing ideologies and geopolitical considerations have fueled the conflict. The longer it continues, the greater the possibility of war between Morocco and Algeria and the greater the possibility of increased hardship and disorder, particularly in Sahara and Morocco, where most of the fighting takes place. As a result, this once neglected land has become an area of grave concern for the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the various allies of the parties involved, notably France, Spain, the United States and the Soviet Union.

This threat to world peace is reason enough for attention, but there are aspects of the conflict that point to other broad issues. The first is, of course, the problem of frontiers. Despite the OAU's recognition of colonial frontiers as a framework for nation-building, some Africans continue to base their demands for independence or border changes on ethnic affinities,

history and geography. In addition to the Moroccans, the Somalis in East Africa claim part of Ethiopia because of ethnic ties; at times, Egypt has tried to exercise influence over the Sudan. Some Cameroonese claim that part of their historic homeland was stolen by the Nigerians in an allegedly fraudulent referendum; and a few Senegalese (who point to a map showing they almost completely surround Gambia) assert a right to absorb their tiny neighbor. Movements to unite ethnic groups like the Ewe of Togo and Ghana, the Lunda of Zaire and Angola, and others occasionally appear. Even the OAU is perhaps not totally consistent; it does not support the Eritrean claim to independence even though the claim is based in part on colonial frontiers established by the Italians. (On the other hand, it is true that a United Nations-sponsored referendum after World War II confirmed Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia.)

Second, there is the related issue of nomads, who continue to inhabit a vast zone of Africa from the Atlantic coast east to the Indian Ocean despite the terrible droughts of recent years. Although thousands of nomads moved to towns in search of water, there must be well over one million herdsmen and herdswomen wandering from the Western Sahara and Mauritania to the Sudan. Without respect for colonial-imposed frontiers, they tend to resist any authority not based on their own system of allegiances and kinship. Mali, Chad, Algeria and other states are seriously challenged by nomadic culture, which is not congenial with the types of authoritarian one-party states they have established. In the Western Sahara, the majority of the population is nomadic, and this poses a problem for anyone who tries to rule.

Third, the struggle for control of the Western Sahara is a purely intra-African affair in which European, Asian and United States interests are not directly involved although one or another of the participants may try to encourage outside intervention. Certainly Africa has suffered from more penetration and manipulation than any other continent; but African conflicts increasingly start, continue and finish without interference. The recent Tanzanian invasion of Idi Amin's Uganda and various Libyan activities fall into this category. No African can honestly blame the United States, the Soviet Union or neocolonialism for conflict in the Sahara; still Africans may try to manipulate or draw in non-African powers for their own benefit.

The fourth question is self-determination. What does it really mean? Are there circumstances in which asking the masses what they desire would be harmful? Africans recognize that self-determination has its limits: the majority opposed independence for Biafra, Eritrea (even though Ethiopia violated the federation

agreement), Katanga Province of Zaire, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, because they feared the breakup of states and the subsequent danger that no African state would ever be viable. In an effort to prove that the Western Sahara could be a viable state, supporters of Sahrawi independence tend to inflate the population to almost one million, while those who oppose it use the figure of less than 75,000 (from the last Spanish census in 1970). At a recent discussion during a meeting of the African Studies Association, proponents of varying points of view accepted the figure of about 120,000. States without a minimal population (in addition to land, resources, communication systems and a legitimate government) may be forever dependent on outside powers, which compromises their claims for sovereignty. Africa has many tiny states already, like Sao Tome and Principe, whose population is less than 100,000.

CLASHING NATIONALISMS

The background of Moroccan nationalism is similar to Ethiopia's: a large indigenous state long preceded European imperial expansion into Africa, and political frontiers shifted during the precolonial period. In Morocco, a well-defined political system has existed continuously at least since the fifteenth century. The cities of Fez, Marrakesh and Rabat have consistently formed the core area, but outlying regions have shifted in and out of the kingdom according to the "military power and network of tribal alliances" of the sultan or king.¹ Areas conquered or freely pledging loyalty to the sultan as their temporal and spiritual leader extended at times as far as Tombouctou in today's Mali, Mauritania, western Algeria, and, of course, the Western Sahara. Personal alliances are not geographic frontiers and cannot be transformed easily into fixed boundaries, however. They depend on the personalities and idiosyncrasies of a few mortal individuals, and when those men lead nomadic groups, fixed frontiers are doubly elusive. Thus Moroccan identity and institutions owe some debt to the French colonizers, who attempted to fix permanent boundaries and establish the institutions of the kingdom.

The nature of the European occupation of Morocco, like the foreign intrusion into Ethiopia, was very different from the colonization experienced by other African areas. Morocco was a protectorate ruled from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not a colony ruled by the Ministry of Colonies. Many local institutions and officials like the sultan remained. Equally important, Spain and France split between themselves an area Moroccans regarded as their own, and Spain continues to hold territory that Moroccans claim is part of their national soil. The Mediterranean port towns of Ceuta and Melilla have been inhabited by Spaniards and have been ruled by Spain since the

¹Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), p. 15.

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.² After 1912 the French protectorate extended over most of what is today Morocco. But the Spanish maintained their influence in Tangiers, which became an international city only nominally under Moroccan sovereignty in 1923; and Spain had absolute control of the town of Ifni on the south Atlantic coast, the area further south in and around the town of Tarfaya and, of course, the Sahara. Because the French also ruled Algeria, they drew the frontiers between the two countries on paper, putting the area of Tindouf into Algeria. The French and Spanish also drew the frontiers between Morocco and Sahara, but Moroccan leaders do not recognize them.

Because of the nature of French and Spanish colonialism, Moroccan national liberation always meant independence and reunification: freedom from European control and reunification as a single political unit, including territory and peoples who at various times in history had pledged loyalty to the sultan or had been conquered by him. These twin goals are not unique in European nationalist movements (as a glance at Italian, German and, more recently, Irish history shows), but other African peoples only demanded the liberation of land defined by the frontiers drawn by Europeans.

In a great burst of nationalism and hope, Morocco regained its independence from France in 1956 under the leadership of the Istiqlal, the major national party, and the very popular King Mohammad V. Unification began the same year when northern Morocco, including Tangiers, was returned to the kingdom. Moroccans immediately ordered the Spanish to leave Ifni, but the Europeans held on. Two years later, after battles with France's troops, Morocco won Tarfaya on the frontier with the Sahara. In 1969, Spain finally ceded Ifni to Morocco, and Moroccan attention turned to the Sahara, where

certain tribal chiefs . . . from about 1965 on began to make contact with Hassan II of Morocco [who succeeded his father to the throne in 1961], about the possibility of some affiliation, allegiance to the Moroccan king, in an attempt to oust the Spanish.³

There had been no referendum in Tangiers, Tarfaya or Ifni, and Moroccans did not see why there should be one in Sahara. Leaders of the Istiqlal believed that Moroccan sovereignty should extend even beyond the

²For a Moroccan view see Robert Rézette, *The Spanish Enclaves in Morocco*, translated by Mary Ewalt (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976).

³Anne Lippert, "The Western Sahara: An Emerging State in Northwest Africa?" *Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Africa of the Committee on International Relations*, House of Representatives, October 12, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), p. 50.

⁴Statement in *ibid.*

⁵John Mercer, *Spanish Sahara* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976), p. 196.

Sahara into Mauritania and southwestern Algeria, but France granted Mauritania independence in 1960, and Algeria won its independence in 1962 within the boundaries set by France. For nine years, from 1960 to 1969, Morocco refused to recognize Mauritanian independence; Moroccans fought Algeria over the area of Tindouf in 1963 and finally agreed to Algerian sovereignty in a signed but unratified treaty in 1972; and the king's troops tried to march to El Ayun, the capital of the Sahara, but were beaten back by the Spanish. Spanish archives doubtless show that colonial authorities constantly feared incursions into their territory through the 1960's because Moroccan nationalists believed that this land should be returned to its rightful owners.

Leaders of Polisario disagree; their nationalism excludes unification with other areas. They admit that some of their people at times pledged allegiance to the king of Morocco and even that they and the Moroccans belonged to the kingdom established by the Berber Almoravides in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. But they maintain that Spanish colonization negated Moroccan claims. In the words of Madjid Abdullah, Polisario representative at the United Nations:

The borders of the western Sahara, as those of other African nations, are a result of colonization. . . . It is within these frontiers inherited from colonialism that we seek to achieve independence.⁴

Unfortunately for the Polisario, Spanish organization of the area was brief and incomplete; unlike their colonization of Ceuta, Melilla and even Ifni the Spaniards had very little time to set up an administration and create an identity. Although they began to take control of territory on the Atlantic coast in 1884, they did not really move inland until after 1940,⁵ and it took them another 20 years to divide the territory into two provinces, Saguia el Hamra in the north and Rio de Oro in the south. In all other African colonies, a first generation of European-educated Africans felt great loyalty to the metropolis, but the peoples of the Sahara probably never felt much loyalty to Spain or developed an Afro-Spanish identity. Most of the people continued to follow their historic grazing routes into Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria.

On the other hand, most Sahrawis share a basic culture and the Islamic religion, and they speak the Hassaniya variety of Arabic spoken by Mauritians but not by Moroccans. Thin, wiry and tan in color, the Sahrawis look like northern Mauritians rather than like Moroccans; some of them have complained that if they were part of Morocco, the fair-skinned urban dwellers governing Morocco would discriminate against them. Despite these unifying factors, Sahrawis are divided into many tribes that have fought among themselves in the past: the Reguibat, a mixture of Berber and Arab, is the largest and

reportedly most dynamic; its members move through Morocco, Mauritania, the Sahara and the Tindouf region. Other important tribes are the Tekna, the Delim who are Arabs, and the Sba, who trace their ancestry to Marrakesh. Tribal divisions are caste-like, in that they are tied to profession and status that cannot be easily changed. Some groups are warriors; others are religious leaders and teachers from generation to generation; a third group must pay tribute to the first two; and a last group supplies slaves to the others.⁶

CLASHING POLICIES

Spanish colonial policy is partly responsible for the impasse. Spain's authoritarian government was unable to adjust to the rise of nationalism in Africa. Spain could not plan for Saharan integration with Morocco or for independence; very late the Spanish rulers inaugurated representative institutions that might have helped develop a sense of Sahrawi identity, which is probably being forged now in war. In 1963, for example, they allowed the Africans to vote in elections to the Cortes (Parliament) in Madrid and to elect mayors of towns like El Ayun, the capital, and Villa Cisneros (today's Dakhta) on the southern coast. In 1967—a full decade after Ghana's independence—the Spanish permitted the first local assembly, the jema'a. Half the members of this consultative body took their seats ex officio as tribal chiefs, and half were elected.⁷ Events elsewhere in the world and the discovery of a huge deposit of phosphates in 1963 forced the Spaniards' hands. Spain had been dependent on Morocco for this mineral used in fertilizer, but the estimated 1.7 billion tons of high grade ore at Bu Craa near the capital promised to make the Europeans self-sufficient. In 1973 and after an investment of over \$400 million, the Sahara began to export phosphates.⁸

By this time, however, forces opposing the continued Spanish presence had organized and were pressing the colonial power to withdraw. United Nations resolution 1514 of December 14, 1960, condemned colonialism in general, and by 1966 the United Nations General Assembly was specifically calling on Spain to plan a referendum for self-determination. Both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity kept up some very mild pressure through the 1960's and early 1970's. Spain

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 124-134.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

⁸John Damis, "The Moroccan-Algerian Conflict over the Western Sahara," in *The Maghreb Review*, vol. 3, no. 2 (March-April, 1979), p. 49.

⁹I. William Zartman, Background Paper, *Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives, July 23-24, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), p. 132.

¹⁰Excerpts in Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1975-76* (New York: Africana, 1976), pp. C67-68.

reacted by introducing more reforms, speeding up the development of the phosphates and transforming the Sahara into an overseas province so that it could pretend that it had no colonies. Following the traditional outmoded colonial pattern, local chiefs were encouraged to express their loyalty to Spain. Nonetheless, demonstrations against Spanish rule took place in El Ayun; organizations sprang up to liberate the area; and Polisario Front emerged in 1973. When Polisario began to attack the conveyor used to transport phosphates to the sea, the Spanish increased their military presence.

Outside the country, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania united to oppose continuing Spanish control. In 1969 and 1970, Algeria and its neighbors agreed that the Sahara should eventually be divided between Morocco and Mauritania, possibly because of Algeria's desire to resolve other problems with Morocco, notably Tindouf. On June 15, 1972, the two countries signed an agreement that acknowledged Algerian sovereignty over Tindouf, set forth a plan for the exploitation of Algerian iron ore, and confirmed "Algerian support for Moroccan claims over . . . the Spanish Sahara. Boumedienne [President of Algeria] called in Ould Daddah [President of Mauritania] and told him to come to terms with Morocco," which he did.⁹ (Some scholars do not agree that Algeria explicitly supported Moroccan claims.) Generalissimo Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator, reacted to the Moroccan-Algerian agreement by enlarging the local assembly and promising a referendum in 1975.

Spain put Morocco on the defensive with the suggestion of a referendum. The king feared that the results would be unfavorable either because of Spanish manipulation or because leaders of Polisario would convince the nomads to vote for independence. As a result, Morocco and Mauritania tried to circumvent a vote by urging the United Nations to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Their goal was to confirm their historic rights to the Sahara. The Court was asked to offer an opinion about the "legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity," at the time of Spanish colonization in the nineteenth century. After hearing arguments the Court agreed in mid-October, 1975, that there had been "legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara." The Court also concurred that there were "legal ties between the Mauritanian entity . . . and the territory of Western Sahara." This pleased the Moroccans and the Mauritians, but the Court added that these ties were insufficient to support their claims to sovereignty. The Court concluded by calling for "self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory."¹⁰ The

United Nations also sent a mission composed of representatives of Ivory Coast, Cuba and Iran; after a week of interviewing people about their preferences in the Sahara they returned to New York. At the same time that the Court issued its judgment, the United Nations issued the report of the mission, which asserted that the Sahrawis wanted their independence.

Morocco was again forced to react quickly to maintain its claim. King Hassan II proclaimed that in fact the Court had recognized the rights of his country and Mauritania and announced a civilian takeover of the territory. He appealed to his subjects to walk into the Sahara to reclaim it for the homeland; this "Green March" began on October 21, 1975. In the next few days, Sahrawis demonstrated in El Ayun against Moroccan and Mauritanian control, and Polisario asked Spain to remain at least until a referendum was held.

Spain could not resist Morocco because its own leader, Francisco Franco, lay mortally ill, and its internal succession crisis prevented forceful action. Under pressure from worldwide anti-colonial sentiment and from Moroccan marchers who crossed into the Sahara the first week in November, the Spanish met with Moroccan and Mauritanian representatives in Madrid. On November 14, the three parties to the dispute announced that the territory would be split between Morocco and Mauritania after the Spanish withdrawal scheduled for February 28, 1976. In return, Morocco permitted Spain to share in the benefits of phosphate production and promised not to demand the return of the cities of Melilla and Ceuta for the time being. Later the Sahara was divided beginning at the 24° parallel.

It is not clear if a majority of the members of the Saharan assembly or jema'a approved the Madrid agreement, but Morocco claimed that they did and that self-determination had been exercised. Shortly thereafter, however, members of the jema'a denounced the agreement and joined Polisario.¹¹ Moroccan and Mauritanian troops moved into the Sahara in the next few weeks and the Spanish military left well before the February deadline. Polisario raced to seize towns in the transition period but was unable to hold settled areas; nonetheless, in February, 1976, it declared the independence of the Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic. Algeria then denounced the Moroccan and Mauritanian takeover and stepped up its assistance to Polisario.¹²

Algerian support for Polisario has permitted the war to continue in the four years since Spanish withdrawal. No one has won it; many have lost.

¹¹For an account of these events see *ibid.*, pp. B153-168.

¹²For an account of Algerian action, see Damis, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

¹³Statement of George M. Houser, in *Hearings*, July 23-24, 1979, p. 3.

Thousands of Sahrawis have fled to Algeria, where they live in refugee camps. Polisario runs these settlements, and observers like George M. Houser, executive director of the American Committee on Africa, have praised their organization and dedication:

I have personally had contact over the last more than 25 years with liberation movements all over the African Continent. I can say, on the basis of what I saw in the several weeks I was there in May, that the Polisario ranks right up with the best of the movements. That is, the best organized, the clearest in their approach and what they are trying to accomplish. They know where they are going and how they are getting there.¹³

Polisario casualties are high for a small population, but thanks to Algerian assistance, their own persistence and Morocco's refusal for years to take the diplomatic offensive in the United Nations and the OAU, the Polisario have won recognition for the Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic from 35 countries.

Mauritania has also lost valuable resources and lives because of the war. It could not in the long run defend the southern third of the Sahara; nor could it adequately protect its own territory without French assistance. Polisario repeatedly attacked Mauritanian iron mining facilities and railroads in the north and has even kidnapped French technicians. As a result, French airplanes strafed Polisario troops, and about 6,000 Moroccan troops moved into Mauritania. Its economic and military situation gradually became desperate, and on July 10, 1978, the military seized power from President Moktar Ould Daddah. Military operations ended, and Polisario proclaimed a cease-fire. After a year of hesitation and confusion (partly due to pressure from Morocco), the Mauriticians signed an agreement with Polisario on August 5, 1979, giving up their claims.

Morocco quickly annexed the former Mauritanian holdings and stepped up military activities, but the war is also costing the kingdom dearly. The army, which now counts at least 40,000 men in the Sahara, has not been successful, and the war is reportedly costing the government about \$1 million a day. Observers blame several factors for Morocco's failures: because King Hassan refuses to trust the military out of fear that they might turn on him and overthrow the monarchy, key tactical decisions must be made by the king in far away Rabat. Second, troops are said to be deeply demoralized because of the alleged smuggling

(Continued on page 136)

Brian Weinstein is the author of *Gabon: Nation Building on the Ogooué* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967) and *Eboué* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), and the coauthor of *Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach*, 2d. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1977).

"The restoration of democratic civilian rule is no guarantee that the governments of Ghana and Nigeria will be able to cope with endemic social conflicts or to fashion economic development policies that generate growth instead of distributing the overwhelming proportion of benefits to a small but growing bourgeoisie of businessmen, professionals, and bureaucrats, ignoring the needs of the mass of workers and peasants."

The Return of Civilian Rule in Nigeria and Ghana

BY JON KRAUS

Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Fredonia

IN late 1979, after democratic elections, political power passed from military praetorians to civilian party politicians in two major West African states, Ghana and Nigeria. This was a significant event; in early 1979, over half the African-ruled states were military regimes, and among those ruled by civilians only two possessed functioning democracies. In 1979, military regimes also disappeared, in some sense, in several other African countries. In Mali and Rwanda military rule was "civilianized," with the military leader retaining power and running unopposed for President under a new constitution; in Uganda and the Central African Empire, brutal military dictators, Idi Amin and "Emperor" Jean-Bedel Bokassa, were removed from power thanks to the interventions of the Tanzanian and French militaries, respectively; and in Chad, a fragile coalition of warring military and civilian factions formed a new government, ending the civil war during which the military regime had collapsed. However, the successor regimes in these states have not yet been able to fashion stable civilian institutions, much less democratic ones.

Thus, the return to democratic civilian rule in Nigeria and Ghana is of singular significance for several reasons. Both Ghana and Nigeria are important African countries. Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with an estimated 80 million people; it is the world's fifth largest oil-exporting country and a new and major voice in African international politics. Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African colony to gain independence (1957), was a pathbreaker in inter-African politics and economic decolonization under President Kwame Nkrumah (1957-1966), and at one point was Africa's most developed African state. Moreover, this was Ghana's second attempt to cast off military rule and recreate democratic political institutions; the first attempt occurred in 1969-1972 after the three-year military regime (1966-1969) that overthrew Nkrumah. Both Ghana and Nigeria have experienced periods of vigorous democratic political competition; they have relatively well-developed civilian social groups and institutions that are highly political, and

their fairly sizable civilian sectors believe in the need of democratic civilian rule and regard military government as an unwanted aberration.

Nonetheless, the road back to civilian political power was long and difficult (though very different) in Ghana and Nigeria. The examination of their paths from military to civilian power must be placed in the context of their political economies and the different socioeconomic conditions they have experienced in recent years.

NIGERIA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

Although there are some 300 ethnic groups in Nigeria, three peoples and their leaders have dominated Nigeria's economic and political life: the Hausa-Fulani people (about 29 percent), organized in conservative, highly stratified Islamic Emirates in the underdeveloped north, which contains a majority of the country's population; the Yoruba (20 percent), both Christian and Muslim, in the southwest; and the highly adaptive Ibo (17 percent) in the southeast. In the first republic (1960-1966), each group controlled one of the three regions, with the northern (Hausa-Fulani) region the senior partner in coalition with the east at the national level. These three groups competed vigorously for the power, status and material rewards of political office, and political life became violent as the north expanded its power and the two southern groups became allies to retain their power. Within each region, also, large minority groups chafed under the rule of the dominant ethnic group—the Tiv, Kanuri and Nupe in the north, the Ibibio, Ijaw and Idoma in the east, and the Edo, Ibo and Ijaw in the west. These minorities constituted an important part of the military, especially the Middle Belt minorities from the north in commissioned and lower ranks. To reduce fears of northern dominance and to satisfy minority desires for some autonomy and access to power, the military regime increased the number of states to 12 in 1967, and to 19 in 1975.

Nonetheless, the Ibo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba peoples competed for political power and resources in a conflict that remained central to the dynamics of

Nigerian politics and society and was often more broadly perceived as a struggle between the peoples of the more highly developed south and the far less developed north. This conflict involved less tribalism than sharp secular competition for access to government power, material resources and status. Economic development has resulted in a Nigerian society about 20 percent urban and has generated a new class structure, including a small and highly acquisitive bourgeoisie, a large and growing wage-earning class, an even larger urban semi-proletariat, and a vast number of middle level bureaucrats and teachers. Politicians and businessmen have sought constituencies among their own ethnic groups, however, seriously exacerbating ethnic conflicts and reducing the perception of class conflict in a society with increasingly glaring inequalities of wealth.

Although in 1960 Nigeria was one of Africa's poorest countries in per capita terms, it experienced dramatic growth after oil became an important export in the mid-1960's. Oil grew to almost 33 percent of Nigeria exports by value in 1966, over 80 percent in 1972-1973, and 92 percent in 1974, with the fourfold increase in oil prices. By 1974-1975 over three-fourths of federal government revenue and over 80 percent of total government revenues were derived from oil. Between 1966 and 1974, oil production increased fivefold while the value of oil exports increased 30 times. Maximum production was reached in 1974 at 2.3 million barrels per day, but production dropped in the following years, in compliance with the production quotas established by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Confronted with enormous new government revenues and foreign exchange, federal and state governments went on a spending spree; development plan expenditures were revised upward and imports soared, until in 1975-1976 Nigeria was experiencing a trade and current accounts deficit that required it to reduce reserves and, in 1978, to borrow abroad on a massive scale. Inflation accelerated, with the Lagos retail price index rising by 100 percent during 1974-1976, 30 percent in 1977, and an estimated 40 percent in 1978, significantly reducing most Nigerians' real wages and standard of living. Agricultural production continued to decline; by 1977, Nigeria was a net food importer. Nigeria's 5.5 percent average annual growth in per capita gross national product (GNP) between 1969 and 1977 was not widely distributed.

Government investment rose dramatically when the regime decided to take over majority ownership in major industries, in partnership with foreign multinationals. The Nigerian National Oil Corporation owns 60 percent of all oil companies (except British Petroleum, which it nationalized in 1979 because of BP's oil shipments to South Africa). In an effort to

transfer productive resources to Nigerian hands, the government also established an indigenization policy, in which foreign companies were compelled to sell 40 percent, 60 percent, or 100 percent equity ownership to Nigerians. Importers, contractors and other businessmen were the initial recipients of Nigeria's oil bounty.

The indigenization policies fostered a new capitalist class, as the state extended bank credit to the fortunate elite to enable Nigerians to buy company shares. By mid-1979, over 500 million shares in 1,858 companies valued at over \$736 million had been transferred to Nigerians. The state thus served as the creator of large-scale domestic capital and as an intermediary between domestic and foreign private capital. Political ties have been crucial in the process. Senior civil servants and politicians serving under the military (as well as military officers) have simultaneously acted as senior public officials, board members of affiliates of multinationals, and investors in local stocks and industries with other Nigerian businessmen.

The prodigious opportunities for enrichment and corruption have been utilized. Head of State Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo noted in 1977 that "we are fast becoming a nation of agents and middlemen, with the attendant easy money and corruption. Our uncontrolled consumption has lost the nation valuable resources." Nigeria has experienced a crime wave of dramatic proportions, fueled by the poverty of most urban dwellers and the conspicuous consumption and easy wealth of the few. The biggest thieves belonged to the elite: the former military and police governors of the states under General Yakubu Gowon, dismissed by Murtala Mohammed in 1975; those who knew how to perpetrate the telex frauds, discovered in 1979, whereby foreign commercial banks were instructed by bank telex to transfer over \$25 million to bogus companies, or who profited by the "bills of lading" frauds, which came to over \$116 million during 1977-79; or the middle and high-ranking Nigerian Central Bank officials, who conspired to smuggle out some \$47 million in banknotes scheduled for destruction.

Despite indigenization policies, bureaucratic regulations imposed to reduce fraud and increase local production and frequent lags in government payment of contracts, Nigeria has welcomed foreign capital. And foreign capital has responded to the possibility of large profits. Nigerians imported luxuries—expensive cars, lace and jewelry (the heaviest consumer of foreign exchange)—until they were banned in 1978. Foreign oil companies reduced exploration when state requirements became onerous; consequently concessions were made, and new funds flowed into exploration. "This is a real free enterprise country," enthused a Gulf Oil executive.

Apart from the government's spending on industrialization projects in which it requires full or partial ownership, state spending has focused on the maintenance of the bloated military and police forces and the development of the country's infrastructure (roads, hydroelectric power, irrigation). With its oil wealth, in 1976 Nigeria also undertook a program of universal primary education (UPE), which extended to an effort to make other levels of education fee-free also. This has been a massive and politically crucial undertaking, designed to equalize opportunities for education between the developed southern states and the much less developed northern regions. Unfortunately, the initial results have been to make educational enrollment more unequal, because the southern states responded to the program more wholeheartedly than northern states and have benefited more fully from the government's massive expansion of secondary teacher training, and university education, necessary to make UPE a success by 1981-1982. In 1979-1980, recurrent federal government expenditures included 17.9 percent for defense, 6.8 percent for police, 31.5 percent for education (including grants to the states), 3.4 percent for health, and a mere 1.2 percent for agriculture. In the capital budget, defense consumes 9.1 percent, manufacturing 20.7 percent, mining (oil) 11 percent, land transport 14.6 percent, education 5.9 percent, and agriculture a mere 2.8 percent. Moreover, government support for agriculture has taken the form of encouragement of large-scale, capital intensive agricultural schemes, financed through bank loans and tax concessions, which does little or nothing for the small peasant producers who constitute 70 percent of the labor force.

In the face of oil production cutbacks, inflation and balance of payments and budget deficits, the Obasanjo military government instituted significant austerity measures in 1977-1979, sharply reducing government spending increases, bank credit expansion and imports. One result has been increased tension over the allocations of federal and state money as funds dried up and projects, including education projects, slowed down or ground to a halt. Conflict exploded on university campuses (which were quickly closed down), first over rising costs for room and board and, in 1979, over the relative allocation of northerners and southerners to scarce places in the 13 universities, a sensitive ethnic-regional issue. In 1975, unemployment was 11.7 percent of the non-agricultural labor force but 37.5 percent of the wage labor force, the employment most desired; it grew in 1978-1979. By 1981-1982, employment will have to be found for the several million primary school leavers who will be unwilling to turn to agriculture.

NIGERIA'S RETURN TO CIVILIAN POWER

The Nigerian Federal Military Government

(FMG), under Obasanjo's leadership, has received wide praise for the systematic and orderly way in which it led Nigeria back to civilian rule. However, Obasanjo's able leadership and the FMG's faithful adherence to the new (Mohammed's 1975) schedule for returning civilian rule were stimulated by widespread and articulate public demands; the military leadership clearly perceived that its ability to maintain the military as a coherent institution required its retirement from political power. The military remained in power in Nigeria for 13 years. The civil war (1967-1970) between Nigeria and the secessionist Eastern region (Biafra) was the first excuse for delaying a return to civilian rule. Yakubu Gowon's increasingly ineffectual and corrupt government in 1973-1974 had come under pronounced and continuous public questioning with regard to progress toward civilian rule, not least from leaders of the three major ethnic groups who expected to wield civilian public power. The dispersed distribution of power in Nigeria—among the states, important social and ethnic groups, and in the military—did not permit Gowon to silence his critics, including some critics within the military who enjoyed status and ethnic group support equal to or greater than Gowon's. Gowon's October, 1974, retreat from the scheduled 1976 date for civilian rule (on the grounds that renewed political dissension threatened the state) undermined his regime's legitimacy among much of the politically articulate public and among junior and senior officers who did not benefit from political office but suffered the criticism leveled at the military. The legitimacy accorded Murtala Mohammed, appointed by military coup leaders to succeed Gowon, derived not only from his rapid and efficient measures to deal with outstanding problems but also from his government's renewed commitment to restore civilian rule step by step by October, 1979, according to a fixed schedule. After Mohammed's assassination in an attempted coup by military factions in January, 1976, the legitimacy of Obasanjo's government rested on his rigid adherence to the civilian rule program. Any departures from the schedule would have aroused widespread public opposition, because the attempted coup had already recreated profound ethnic cleavages within the military.

In addition, military leaders had worked hard to rebuild the officer corps and the army after its fragmentation in the coup in 1966 and the internecine 1967-1970 civil war. The military was rent with cleavages, including crucial ethnic ones, exacerbated by the military's political involvements. The murder of Mohammed, an enormously popular northerner of aristocratic background, aroused the north sharply and induced nervous southern officers to make themselves scarce. The indirect evidence of an ethnic factor in the two coup plots derived from the fact that most

officers involved came from middle belt (minority) areas that had previously supported Gowon.¹

Thus, the military government itself developed a powerful stake in a return to civilian rule in orderly stages: the submission of a draft constitution by the constitutional commission (August, 1976); the reorganization of and non-party elections for local government offices (December, 1976). After a year of fairly animated public debate over the draft constitution, a Constituent Assembly was convened in October, 1977, its members chosen by the local government councils but composed almost exclusively of Nigeria's upper middle class of lawyers, businessmen and company directors, professors, former senior civil servants and some ex-officers. In August, 1978, the Constituent Assembly presented the FMG with the proposed constitution, which it promulgated after adding 17 amendments that tended to strengthen federal power. In late September, the ban on political parties was lifted; and in April, 1979, five elections were scheduled for July-August, for the Federal House and Senate, the state assemblies, state governors and President.

The constitution of Nigeria resembles the United States model. A popularly elected President and Vice President may serve no more than two four-year terms; a Federal Assembly is composed of a Senate of 95 members, 5 from each of the 19 states, and a House of 450 members, distributed by population; an independent judiciary has at its apex a Supreme Court; and in each state there is an elected governor, unicameral Assembly and independent judiciary. Constitutional amendments require passage by two-thirds of both federal houses and two-thirds of the state assemblies; entrenched provisions require three-fourths approval in the federal houses. A division of federal and state powers gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction in the most important economic and regulatory activities. Senate confirmation is required for Cabinet and Supreme Court appointments; and federal and state ministers may not be members of their respective legislatures. The controversial problem of federal financial disbursements to the states was solved by drawing them from a "distributable pool," with 50 percent on the basis of equality and 50 percent on the basis of population.

Nigeria's overriding concern with national unity, with preventing a recurrence of the ethnic-regional cleavages that tore apart the first republic, led to the establishment of some singular constitutional provisions: the national Cabinet must include a minister

from each of the nineteen states; the successful presidential candidate must receive not only the most votes but at least one-fourth of the vote in two-thirds of the nineteen states (a similar provision applies to governors in local council areas); a failure to win this sends the election between the two leading candidates to an electoral college of all 1,347 federal and state assembly members, a provision altered by the military to a simple run-off. Most important, the constitution provides for a wholly independent Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), with the sole power to run federal and state elections, to ensure that all parties are national in scope in terms of representation, and to certify them before they can contest elections. The logistics of the five elections was an enormous task, involving 48 million registered voters (a large overcount), 400,000 FEDECO employees and 97,000 polling stations, at a cost of almost \$100 million.

The election posed questions involving the number of parties to be permitted, to what extent they would reflect established ethnic-regional cleavages, the fairness of the campaign itself, and the formation of a national government. By the time parties could be registered in December, 1978, some 52 political organizations had applied. Ultimately, many united, and FEDECO certified only five parties to contest the elections. These parties reflected familiar core constituencies and leading personalities, but with a significantly broader base. The Unity party of Nigeria (UPN) was centered upon the Yoruba people, led by Obafemi Awolowo, who had led the Action Group in the first republic and the federal opposition, and been a federal minister under Gowon. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's premier nationalist, former head of the predominantly Ibo NCNC, and President of the first republic, came out of retirement to join the Nigerian People's party (NPP), which had Ibo and substantial middle belt northern support. When Azikiwe was selected as the NPP's presidential candidate, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, a millionaire businessman whose support lies in the non-Hausa northeast, broke away to form the Great Nigeria People's party (GNPP). Alhaji Aminu Kano, long a champion of the lower class northern Hausa, a highly revered mallam (teacher) and an opposition party leader in the first republic, formed the National Redemption party (NRP), with strong support in two northern states,

(Continued on page 128)

Jon Kraus has frequently undertaken research in West Africa. His most recent publications include "The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana," in Ukandi Dimachi and Lester Trachtman, eds., *Industrial Relations in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1978) and "Strikes and Labor Power in a Post-Colonial African State," *Development and Change* (April, 1979).

¹An excellent study of the Nigerian military, its cleavages, major problems, and sources of support for civilian rule is Ian Campbell's "Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal," K. Panter-Brick, ed., *Soldiers and Oil* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 58-99.

"Because South Africa was formerly protected from the winds of change by the windscreen buffers of Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique (among others), the essentially pragmatic nature of the Afrikaners was hidden by the mask of apartheid ideology."

Changing South Africa

BY JOHN GROTPETER

Professor of Political Science, St. Louis College of Pharmacy

"I believe in reforming and improving policies if this is born out of conviction and realistic idealism. We must be prepared to eliminate worn-out practices and restrictions . . . South Africa dare not follow the path of oppressing other races."

THESE words came from the new Prime Minister, Pieter Botha, in January, 1979. Botha also spoke out at a Transvaal National party congress packed with Conservatives, where one man complained that he had to stand in line behind a black woman at his local post office because racial segregation signs had been removed. Botha pounced on the delegates, saying that he would not tolerate what he considered unchristian attitudes toward other races. The country's whites would have to sacrifice their "selfishness," he said and personally he would not be fettered by old-fashioned racist ideas.

It would be a great mistake to assume that a radical restructuring of South African society and government was occurring just because Pieter Botha made a few statements to his party, proposed a few changes in the apartheid system, and hinted at more drastic possibilities. But it took someone like Piet Botha, from the hard-line, faithful-to-apartheid national party (NP) bureaucracy, to adopt a new pragmatic attitude toward his country's racial policies. Botha has also played on the theme of fear. He is concerned about both the "red danger" and the "black menace," and his message to the whites of South Africa is clear: accept some degree of coexistence with the blacks, or face destruction at the hands of a Marxist onslaught from neighboring countries.¹

Because South Africa was formerly protected from the winds of change by the windscreen buffers of Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique

(among others), the essentially pragmatic nature of the Afrikaners was hidden by the mask of apartheid ideology. Writing just before Botha took office as Prime Minister in October, 1978, Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee asked, "Can South Africa Change?" They note that "specific interests rather than an immutable ideology [often] condition Afrikaner strategies." They continue:

But what happens if the situational context of respective reference groups changes so that racial beliefs no longer serve the group interest but amount to an obstacle to new goals and strategies? The concept of ethnic mobilization suggests that . . . [racial sentiments] can be readjusted and discarded according to changing circumstances. . . . To consider racial perceptions as immutable qualities ignores their changing functions. Ethnic attachments persist, but only as long as they serve a purpose.²

In the late 1970's, Afrikaner spokesmen increasingly emphasize a purpose that supersedes ethnic chauvinism, cultural purity, or anti-communism, that is, survival.³ As Adam writes:

Who has time to bicker about policy changes when a gun is pointed at you? Survival means countering a challenge to life itself, the safety of sleeping securely at night. With such appeals to universal protection needs, the leadership can advertise controversial constitutional proposals. . . .

Survival politics allows the leadership to determine internal changes without laying itself open to charges of betrayal of doctrine . . . Survival is sufficiently serious to permit officeholders to manipulate domestic priorities on the basis of alleged superior information. . . . On the other hand, if the debate gets out of hand, the threatening enemy can be redefined to restore unity. . . . Therefore, rallying behind the party leadership against the agitators, whoever they are, has become the duty of all true patriots. . . .⁴

With this background, it is clear how Botha inspired enthusiasm in some of the elected black "homeland" leaders who met with him in Cape Town in January, 1979. His approach was described as "open, honest, receptive and flexible," and as "a breath of fresh air." Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu noted that Botha had adopted a "radical" new approach, abandoning the ideological "straitjacket" of ex-Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster. Chief Lennox Sebe, chief

¹See Gary Thatcher, writing in *Christian Science Monitor*, October 3, 1979, p. 4.

²Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1979), p. ix, p. 63. See also the surveys demonstrating shifting attitudes among Afrikaners, *ibid.*, pp. 124-127.

³Note South Africa's current major economic arrangements with Marxist Mozambique.

⁴Adam and Giliomee, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-135.

minister of the Ciskei said, "We are entering a new era. This is the first time we have got a leader who is prepared to stretch his hand of friendship to the blacks. It was also refreshing to meet a man who has a philosophy, and not an ideology."⁵

Initial proposals from Botha indicate that major changes are planned in South Africa. The changes do not begin to weaken the economic and political control held by whites. Nevertheless, the term "cosmetic changes" does not do justice to what is happening.

To understand developments in South Africa in 1979, four elements of South Africa's system of apartheid or separate development may be differentiated: grand apartheid; petty apartheid; economic apartheid; and police control.

Grand apartheid is the long-range plan to divide South Africa into a constellation of 10 "independent" enclaves according to ethnic or tribal background. These 10 tribal reserves (or Bantustans) are to be allowed only 13 percent of the country's land, yet they are expected to be the "homelands" for over 70 percent of the population. This land, much of which is eroded, unproductive and overworked, is also fragmented. Most of the Bantustans are not contiguous; they are separated into sections by white-owned farms and even by entire white towns. Even if earlier consolidation plans are implemented, KwaZulu, for example, will consist of 10 non-contiguous parts.

Until 1979, only two of the territories, Transkei and Bophuthatswana, had been granted "independence" by South Africa. (No other country has granted them diplomatic recognition.) On September 13, 1979, the northernmost Bantustan, Venda, was also granted "independence." Just south of the Zimbabwe border and west of Kruger National Park, Venda will remain

economically dependent on South Africa, perhaps for generations. Many foreigners see the Bantustan policy as a ruse, because there is little chance that any of the Bantustans can stand on their own feet. Moreover, their very existence allows the government to regard all urban black workers as aliens and thus deportable to their tribal "homelands," even though the urban blacks may come from families that have not lived in the homeland for several generations, if ever.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Botha has taken one step that is considered drastic in the perspective of South African history. Whereas all Prime Ministers since 1936 have refused to reevaluate the figure of 13 percent for native reserves (a percentage hardened into law by the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936),⁶ Botha has informed the chief ministers of the Bantustans that he wants to add considerably to their territory and is hopeful that new negotiations will consolidate some of the fragmented areas. He has appointed a government commission that is considering redrawing the boundaries. Botha has also revealed that he may cease the practice of spending government money to buy white-owned land in the homelands, raising the possibility that entire white cities may be incorporated into the expanded black states.

For those seeking immediate and drastic change in South Africa, these changes appear to be only cosmetic, perhaps intended to remove some pressure and to give a modicum of legitimacy to the Bantustan chief ministers. Botha plans to retain the separate development system intact. And he seeks to expand the concept indirectly by his proposal to create a grouping of southern African states, among them Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and even perhaps Zimbabwe (depending on the results of the 1980 elections). All these states would be linked by economic and transportation ties, that would make them dependent on South Africa economically, militarily and even politically, much like the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda are dependent today. Nonetheless, Botha's suggestions are bold in light of the Afrikaner political tradition.⁷

Petty apartheid is not very petty for a black in South Africa.⁸ Nevertheless, the term is used to encompass the broad spectrum of laws that have created and/or sanctioned practices of racial discrimination, including separate transportation facilities for whites and blacks,⁹ separate park benches for the two groups (if blacks can find any not reserved for whites), restaurants and hotels that refuse to admit blacks, separate athletic teams, and theatrical performances segregated by race. In recent years, some of these barriers have been breached, in part because of international pressures. Botha's predecessor, Prime Minister Vorster, was not inclined to make changes in the system without a particularly strong motivation, like South Africa's increasing isolation from world

⁵*Christian Science Monitor*, January 24, 1979, p. 6.

⁶See Jeffrey Butler, Robert Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 9-12, for a discussion of the land question.

⁷Afrikaners are the South African whites, about 60 percent of the total white population, who trace their ancestry to early Dutch or French settlers. They also differ linguistically from the 40 percent of the whites who are English-speaking, most of whose ancestors came to South Africa after 1800.

⁸The word black is increasingly used to group all those termed by the South African government non-whites. This includes the indigenous Africans, bushmen, coloured (mulatto), and Asians (primarily from India). The growing black consciousness movement in South Africa is primarily responsible for broadening the use of this term. See *Steve Biko: I Write What I Like*, edited by Aelred Stubbs (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), and Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), especially chapters eight and nine.

⁹White visitors have been given first class railroad coach accommodations while paying for third class, to assure racial segregation.

competitive sports or the refusal of a noted playwright or actor to allow a performance unless there was integrated seating.

In October, 1979, however, Pieter Botha challenged his countrymen to "adapt or die," announcing he would propose new laws that would permit blacks to eat in restaurants or attend multiracial theaters, if the restaurants or theaters involved applied for permanent international status. He also proposed that blacks be allowed to qualify for higher paying jobs currently reserved for whites and that some South African sports teams be opened to multiracial membership. He promised municipal status to urban black townships like Soweto, granting some blacks there 99-year leases on houses and property. In his October speech Botha said,

There are higher things in life than to stare at the color of a man's skin. We are prepared to allow black people into our kitchens to prepare our food, but the moment a black appears next to us in the post office, we say, 'Go away.' What kind of nonsense is that?¹⁰

Despite this, on December 27 South African police forcibly removed 500 blacks bathing on white beaches. Blacks had complained that "their" beaches were overcrowded.

Undoubtedly, for many Afrikaners, the most shocking of Botha's proposals was his suggestion that the government might consider repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act, made internationally famous in the 1953 novel by Alan Paton, *Too Late the Phalarope*. Over 15,000 South Africans have been prosecuted for having sexual relations or marrying across the color barrier.

An outpouring of bitter opposition followed. Jaap Marais, head of the far-right Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP), called the proposals a "cowardly appeasement that can only lead to the white man's downfall and annihilation." Reactions from Botha's own supporters caused him to clarify his position on the Immorality Act. When Judge Jan Steyn argued that laws against interracial sex and marriage should be repealed, Botha suggested that "these are matters which belong to Parliament." Advertisements in the National party paper, *Die Transvaler*, said that the Prime Minister "talks of improvement, not abolition," and noted that "Botha needs to consolidate his strength in the party before pressing ahead with his suggested changes in the race laws."¹¹ In the long run, Botha seems intent on eliminating blatant and inflammatory forms of discrimination while implementing

the broader apartheid plan to surround a mostly white nation with small, dependent black states.

ECONOMIC APARTHEID

Some critics maintain that all other changes are irrelevant as long as economic and political control remains in the hands of the Afrikaners. With the price of gold soaring on the world market and the sale of Krugerrands outpacing South Africa's ability to produce them, the South African economy is fairly well under control despite a five-year recession. If anything is wrong, it is the continuing skilled labor shortage that has required the upgrading of blacks into positions previously reserved for whites. Despite the "promotions," however, a black is rarely found in a supervisory position over whites.

Even some foreign-owned companies have had labor difficulties. A Ford Motor Company subsidiary in Port Elizabeth faced serious problems in the last months of 1979. Black employees of Ford accused the company of racism in both promotion policies and pay scales, despite assurances to the contrary. About 700 black workers walked off the job in protest. Because this was the fourth such walkout, the company fired them, and 29 of the protest leaders were later arrested. Ford claimed that the protesters had resigned by leaving their jobs, but 27 percent of them have since returned to work. Moreover, half the blacks employed at the plant never left, the company maintains, including all the leaders of the black trade union there. Ironically, Ford is one of the few companies in South Africa that has recognized a black union.

While skilled white labor is in short supply, many blacks remain unemployed. Social and political conditions make it impossible to determine a precise statistic on unemployment, but it has been estimated that an economic growth rate of over eight percent a year (far above recent projections) would be needed merely to absorb the quarter of a million blacks leaving school each year.¹² Some 84.7 percent of all black employees are working at the minimum wage level, compared to 0.24 percent of all white workers.

With black labor playing a significant role in the South African price and profit structure, Botha surprised observers by proposing in early May that black workers be permitted to form officially recognized labor unions and that employers be encouraged to pay black and white employees equal wages and to provide integrated company cafeterias and washrooms.¹³ The "encouragement" of employers falls far short of a demand, however, and the initial proposal about unions was not meant to apply to non-resident blacks, meaning foreigners and those the government regards as legal residents of the "homelands." In June, the proposals were presented to Parliament.

Initial domestic and international reactions were far from favorable. In addition to the predictable

¹⁰Quoted in *Time*, October 15, 1979, p. 64.

¹¹*Los Angeles Times*, October 31, 1979, Part VI, pp. 1-2.

¹²New York Times News Service, printed in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 25, 1979, p. 28G.

¹³The proposals stemmed from a government-appointed labor commission led by Nicholas Wiehann, whose recommendations went much further than the government proposals.

right-wing opposition, the restricted nature of the proposal received much negative comment, despite the fact that black unions had formerly been officially banned.¹⁴ In late September, 1979, Botha extended the right to unionize to migrants—contract workers regarded by the government as citizens not of South Africa but of the three “independent homelands”—and to commuters, whose homes are in the seven non-“independent homelands” close enough to their city of employment so that they can commute regularly.¹⁵ Perhaps one-third or more of South Africa’s workers are in these two categories so this step was a significant broadening of the original proposals.

The reaction among black unionists has become more favorable, but blacks are still cautious. Some see the proposals as a way for the government to improve its control over the black labor force, especially in view of the spread of “illegal” black unions. While legal registration will allow a union to take a seat on one of the South African industrial councils (where most collective agreements are reached), it will also subject the union to government discipline and control, including a ban on political activities, government access to its financial statements and balance sheets, and control of overseas funding. Nor do the new proposals allow the registration of a multiracial union, nor of many black South Africans currently members of existing illegal unions who do not fall into one of the two new categories.¹⁶ It is estimated that half the members of the existing illegal unions would have to be dismissed from the unions before they could qualify for registration.

POLICE CONTROL

South Africa’s social structure depends heavily on the enforcement power of the police.¹⁷ For the most part, the police have been on the offensive, arresting people under the various laws designed to defuse any black political efforts or any attempts by whites to assist the blacks. In 1979, the police were suddenly on the defensive. On May 3 and again on November 2,

urban guerrillas attacked police stations in Soweto. On the first occasion, one policeman was killed and five other people were wounded, while in November two policemen were killed, and a policeman and a civilian were wounded. Weapons used in the well-planned attacks included hand grenades and assault rifles. The police claimed that the weapons were Soviet-made, and tried to link the attacks to two banned parties, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. The ANC especially receives strong support from Moscow. None of the attackers nor their weapons in the November incident were captured.

Meanwhile the government was busy prosecuting other urban guerrillas, sometimes on tenuous grounds, and despite widespread international protests and pleas by government leaders. On April 6, 1979, Solomon Mahlangu, a former Soweto high school student, was executed at the central prison in Pretoria for murder. He had not taken part in the murder of two white men in Johannesburg, but was declared responsible for the acts of two friends. More important to the police, perhaps, was the fact that he had been recruited by the banned ANC and received guerrilla training for two years in Angola and Mozambique before returning to South Africa with the other two. When the death penalty was announced in the courtroom, Mahlangu made the clenched fist gesture of black power. On November 15, 1979, the same sign was given by 12 men found guilty of taking part in guerrilla battles against government troops, all of whom were said to be members of the ANC. Eleven received long prison terms; one, James Mange, was sentenced to hang for plotting the destruction of a police station and magistrate’s court, although he was not found guilty of any killing or even of armed action. He was apparently convicted and sentenced to death because of his training in guerrilla action in the Soviet Union.

While white South Africans have long feared the outbreak of urban violence and even respected African figures like Bishop Desmond Tutu have predicted that people may die in the struggle against apartheid, some Afrikaners were first made aware of their government’s role in racial unrest by a book published in late 1978 that became a best seller.¹⁸ The author, Elsa Joubert, held extensive interviews with a black woman and published them in the Afrikaans language. The life story of Poppie Nongena shocked its readers much as *The Holocaust* television series shocked the Germans. It caused an outpouring of guilt from Afrikaners who had never realized the effect of the restrictive laws on the daily lives of the blacks, who suddenly became flesh and blood through Poppie’s words and Joubert’s prose. After reading the book, Professor Johan Degenaar, a political philosopher at the University of Stellenbosch, called the apartheid laws “structural

¹⁴Some existed illegally.

¹⁵*Africa Report*, November-December, 1979, p. 28.

¹⁶*Africa Confidential*, November 28, 1979, pp. 1-3.

¹⁷See two recent books: Dennis Herbstein, *White Man, We Want To Talk To You* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1979), and Baruch Hirson, *Year of Fire, Year of Ash* (London: Zed Press, 1979). Both books tell the story of the black consciousness movement and its effect on the Soweto riots of 1976. Both show the role of the police and of the Ministry of Justice; see especially Herbstein, chapter 6. Two older but powerful studies of the South African system of justice are Joel Carlson, *No Neutral Ground* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1973), and A.S. Mathews, *Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

¹⁸Elsa Joubert, *Die Swerfjare Van Poppie Nongena* (*The Wandering Years of Poppie Nongena*) (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1978).

violence" for which the Afrikaners were to blame.

Although some Africans took the violent route to change, others were taking a more moderate approach. The Soweto-based Committee of Ten formed a political body called the Soweto Civic Association in September, 1979. Its leader, Nthato Motlana, plans to recruit 100,000 dues-paying members in the Soweto area, and hopes that similar groups will emerge around the country. Its goals include "unfettered freehold land tenure," a totally autonomous city council, and large grants from the government to subsidize Soweto's budget. Motlana also called for the principle of one man-one vote in South Africa.¹⁹

Another new political group is the Azanian People's Organization (Azapo). When it was first announced in May, 1978, its entire executive was immediately detained without trial and two of its leaders were banned six months later. In late September, 1979, Azapo adopted a constitution and chose Curtis Nkondo as president. Black consciousness is the basis for its political program.²⁰

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha National Movement is also significant. Although it is based on the Zulus and centered in the KwaZulu "homeland," it has strong support in Soweto, where Zulus and non-Zulus respect Buthelezi's leadership. This makes the chief a competitor of Motlana's, whom he calls an opportunist and elitist. Motlana, in turn, considers Buthelezi a traitor for functioning within the "homeland" system. Although Buthelezi believes he can achieve change in South Africa by negotiating with Botha, a recent report indicated that Buthelezi may have met secretly in London with the banned ANC leaders.²¹ Motlana insists that talks with Botha are futile until Botha shows an ability to effect change and make whites accept it. "When he does away with the pass laws, then I will believe he means what he says," Motlana has remarked.

THE PASS LAWS

No aspect of apartheid is more humiliating for blacks and more hated than the potential of daily harassment under the "pass laws," which allow almost any white to challenge any black to produce a document authorizing his presence in a white area.²²

A major change in pass law enforcement occurred in 1979. In his article, undoubtedly based on 1977 figures, Philip Frankel noted, "There has also been a significant decline in the number of prosecutions and convictions under the pass laws since 1971-2. . . ."²³ Yet 1978 figures (released in March, 1979) show that 272,887 blacks were arrested for influx control violations, an increase of 100,000 over 1977. Furthermore, in the Johannesburg area alone, from January 16 to 31, 1979, there were over 4,000 arrests under the pass laws, compared to 2,382 for all of December, 1978.²⁴ In the first quarter of 1979, the average daily pass law arrests in the Johannesburg area totaled 165, compared to 107 daily in 1978.²⁵

The government's concern with influx control and the enforcement of pass laws was demonstrated by the passage of a law that increased the penalty for employers of illegal workers from R100 to R500 (about \$600). While the increase was scheduled to take effect in July, 1979, a three-month moratorium was granted by the government as a result of the economic chaos that began when employers suddenly fired all employees of whose status they were not certain. The man in charge of enforcement, Pieter Koornhof (Minister of Cooperation and Development), ruled that any African who had been living illegally in a white area for three years or had been employed by the same person for one year, could register as a legal worker during the moratorium, thus avoiding banishment to the "homelands." Koornhof simultaneously warned, however, that controls would be strictly enforced to limit new arrivals from the rural areas.

During the three months, only about 50,000 Africans registered out of an estimated 500,000 "illegals." Those who registered found that registration is only valid for one year and that if they lose their job they are no longer entitled to legal residence in the area. Some Africans fear that "illegals" will be unable to find work with employers wary of the large fine and will be forced either to return to the "homelands" or to turn to crime in the streets.²⁶

Little information about the pass laws made headlines in 1979. What did become an international story were the revelations of scandal in the Information Ministry.²⁷ Because the subject has received such

(Continued on page 134)

¹⁹*Africa Report*, November-December, 1979, p. 28.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Voice of America, Safari newscast, November 9, 1979.

²²For a brief but thorough study of the system, see Philip Frankel, "The Politics of Passes: Control and Change in South Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2 (June, 1979), pp. 199-217.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 213.

²⁴*Africa Report*, May-June, 1979, p. 36.

²⁵*Africa Report*, September-October, 1979, p. 23.

²⁶Voice of America, Safari newscast, December 24, 1979.

²⁷See Richard Dale's article in the March, 1979, issue of *Current History* for a preliminary analysis, especially p. 102.

John J. Grotzinger, director of the Liberal Arts Division at the St. Louis College of Pharmacy, is the author of *Historical Dictionary of Swaziland* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1975), *Historical Dictionary of Zambia* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1979), and *The Pattern of African Decolonization: A New Interpretation* (co-author, Warren Weinstein). His research on central and southern African political parties will soon be published as part of an encyclopedia of African political parties.

"Most important, the London negotiations may have removed the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from the international spotlight. With the lifting of sanctions . . . Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will cease to be a problem of the international community. . . . At worst, the war there will be another civil war rather than a worldwide cause."

Western Policy in Southern Africa

BY KENNETH ADELMAN

Senior Political Scientist, SRI International

IN an age of staunch anticolonization, the world cheered as Britain took colonial possession of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in late 1979 for the first time since granting it unique status as a "self-governing colony" in 1923. Without doubt, this anachronism and the diplomatic steps preceeding it were the most sensational Western moves in southern Africa in 1979, far outshining Western diplomatic efforts in Namibia and pressure upon South Africa itself.

First, conditions inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had reached a stalemate. After the April, 1979, elections installing Bishop Abel Muzorewa as Prime Minister, the war did not slacken nor did the United Nations economic, political and military sanctions fall away. Control of the administrative structure, the economy and the military remained in white hands, although blacks assumed some very top positions. The new constitution contained a number of provisions including entrenched clauses, preservation of civil service protection, and the continued use of white-controlled committees for appointments that all but guaranteed effective white control in the 1980's. While it was clearly false that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia remained as firmly white controlled as before, it was also false that the state had moved to real black majority rule.

Second, the main opponent of the Salisbury government, the Patriotic Front, was likewise forestalled in its "march" to "armed victory." Indeed, the two-legged group, with ZAPU headed by Joshua Nkomo and ZANU led by Robert Mugabe, was still fighting inconclusive though bloody battles.* The six-and-a-half-year war has already cost 20,000 lives, mostly the guerrillas'. The 80 percent black Rhodesian army, directed by a black Prime Minister and defense minister (Muzorewa assumed both hats), was a fine fighting force, long on morale, flexibility and mobility though short on equipment and the manpower needed to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

The countries in the neighborhood also found

themselves boxed into an increasingly painful war. Zambia, in particular, was in decline; all that was rising were the political and economic costs of hosting Nkomo's forces. The Rhodesian army hammered away at ZAPU forces near the capital of Lusaka and, late in 1979, began to target Zambia—the critical railways, roads and other transportation routes used by that landlocked country. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was forced to open transportation through Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and to buy South African food and fertilizers to fend off widespread starvation. Mozambique also suffered from hosting Robert Mugabe's forces, particularly as it was pounded by the Rhodesian army. The black-ruled Marxist government's only hedge against appalling deterioration was to lean even more heavily on white ruled and firmly anti-Marxist South Africa, its staunchest enemy.

The other three front-line states were also affected. Tanzania was immersed in Ugandan politics after it overthrew the grisly Idi Amin through armed invasion. Botswana suffered from the increased tempo of the Rhodesian war though (like Mozambique) close ties with South Africa helped stabilize the economy. Angola had to switch its attention to traumas close to home—the death of founding President Augustinho Neto and the ongoing problem of UNITA** insurgency in the south and southeast.

In Pretoria, the Afrikaner regime of Prime Minister Pieter Botha was straining valiantly to institute internal reforms despite right-wing opposition and to cope with Namibia. It was bankrolling perhaps half of Rhodesia's military budget and had sent some thousand paramilitary troops into Rhodesia.

In Britain, the new Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher found economic problems at home and security problems in Northern Ireland difficult enough. It wanted to settle the Rhodesian conflict through diplomacy or to recognize the Muzorewa government. This British inclination placed enormous pressure on the Patriotic Front. Lord Carrington, the new Foreign Secretary, was determined to pursue the diplomatic approach as far

*ZAPU is an acronym for the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and ZANU for the Zimbabwe African National Union.

**National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

as it would go and then to end Britain's role in Rhodesia once and for all.

In Washington, the administration of Jimmy Carter also faced grave problems from the Persian Gulf eastward to the Korean peninsula and northward to NATO modernization. The United States was convinced that Rhodesia remained a potential super-power flashpoint. The State Department's top adviser on Soviet affairs, Marshall Shulman, told Congress in October, 1979, that Rhodesia would be the world's most dangerous battleground should the London Conference fail. "The potential for escalation of violence in southern Africa remains the most serious potential problem on the horizon in United States—Soviet relations."

The Soviet Union may have shared this assessment. In any case, it found the Rhodesian war increasingly distasteful partly because it may have been supporting the wrong side all those years. Although the Soviet Union armed Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe's group had become militarily more proficient and perhaps more popular (among black Rhodesians) politically. Thus East European countries began to supply Mugabe with arms late in 1979, surely at the request of Moscow.

Soviet leaders also came to see that the opportunities for outside military intervention in Rhodesia were limited. Cuban soldiers were busy elsewhere—in Angola to the tune of some 20,000 and in Ethiopia to the tune of more than 16,000. The Rhodesian army was not a pushover for outside forces especially with the high possibility that South African counterintervention would follow Cuban or East German intervention.

In the wake of the London Conference, London is attempting a political recolonization without any real recolonization. The British administrator lacks troops—beyond the 1,200 soldiers from Kenya, Fiji and other Commonwealth nations—loyal to him alone during the brittle transition period. With this fatal flaw, the London agreement on Rhodesia could come to resemble the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam.

But this is not to discount the tremendous importance of the Rhodesian negotiations. Britain's new Tory Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, left the summer, 1979, Commonwealth Conference in Zambia unscathed, indeed with enhanced prestige. In light of the rabid rhetoric—Nigeria angrily nationalizing British Petroleum operating there on the Conference's eve, Zambia threatening to expel Britain from the Commonwealth, and Tanzania ranting—this was no mean feat.

The London Conference adroitly excluded the bumptious Africanists in power in Washington. The United States had flung itself into this stew because of symbolism; it never had interests in Rhodesia sufficient to warrant its missionary diplomacy there.

Most important, the London negotiations may have removed the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from the international spotlight. With the lifting of sanctions by the United States and the United Kingdom and by African nations and the United Nations Security Council, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will cease to be a problem of the international community (as it has been since 1966). At worst, the war there will be another civil war in Africa rather than a worldwide cause.

NAMIBIA

Not even a slim element of success has cheered negotiators dealing with Namibia, the other colonial problem in southern Africa. This territory has long been under South African control, even though the United Nations has demanded that it be given full independence. Since April, 1978, when Pretoria accepted the plan for transition developed by the "contact group," composed of the five Western members of the Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Canada), negotiations have faltered.

There are several reasons for this sorry state of affairs. The West and Pretoria differ sharply on the goal of an independent Namibia; their goals are as divergent as their views on a proper negotiation process. What the contact group applauds as constructive ambiguity—"keeping all options open"—Pretoria criticizes as cynical manipulation. Likewise, it has been difficult for the negotiators to keep SWAPO (the Marxist "liberation group" headed by Sam Nujoma) in tow as the talks evolved. Nor have the working relations between the contact group and the United Nations Secretariat been clearly defined.

Meanwhile, South Africa has moved ahead and in May, 1979, it agreed to give the constituent assembly of Namibia full legislative powers, subject to final approval by the Administrator-General. The assembly then passed legislation to end racial discrimination in housing and public facilities (excluding new schools and hospitals), with stiff penalties for violation. Conservative white reaction was abrupt and even violent, but the measures were enforced.

In August, 1979, South Africa appointed a new executive over the territory: Professor Gerrit Viljoen, rector of the Rand Afrikaans University and chairman of the secretive Afrikaner clan called the *broederbond*. Viljoen is a moderate on racial issues—in the South African spectrum, anyway—as indicated by his talks with urban black leaders like those in the Committee of Ten of Soweto.

The new administrator faces severe economic and political problems. The diplomatic stall has halted economic development, because neither South Africans nor international tycoons are eager to invest additional sums in Namibia until the situation stabilizes. And black-white attitudes are unmistakably

hardening. For blacks, the earlier euphoria over looming independence has turned into deep bitterness about white motivation and behavior. For whites, and not just the reactionary opponents of anti-discrimination statutes, continued SWAPO attacks on white farmers and their families fuel distrust of any blacks.

It now seems unlikely that the Western diplomatic initiative will prove successful, i.e., that SWAPO-Nujoma and South Africa can be brought into agreement on a final transition plan anytime soon. Serious points of disagreement over the monitoring of SWAPO guerrilla bases outside the territory and the provision for SWAPO bases within linger. Worse yet, such disagreements are symptomatic (rather than causal) of the deep antipathy that has long festered between South Africa and SWAPO, which has become still more bitter in recent times. For Pretoria, this seething is heightened by a profound distrust of the United Nations Secretariat and of the West.

While South Africa will continue to seek Western recognition for Namibian independence, it will wait until the upcoming United States presidential elections for dramatic initiatives. Pretoria believes that conservative governments in London and Washington might accept a political solution in Namibia that include most internal black movements but exclude SWAPO-Nujoma on terms the current administrations in London and Washington could not easily swallow. But it must be noted that South African perceptions of United Kingdom and United States conservatives—as of so many things—are often appallingly naive. So Pretoria will probably underestimate the concessions it must provide to Namibian blacks to elicit Western support or the extent to which its own deep involvement in the territory must end.

And South Africa wishes desperately to retain a large role in Namibia. The perceived importance of Namibia to South African economic, political and security interests makes Namibia far more important to South Africa than Rhodesia. South Africans harbor a deep sense of commitment toward Namibia, which is lacking in their attitude toward Rhodesia.

The Afrikaner¹ sense of responsibility is deeper than any calculation of self-interest which, in itself, might prompt South African withdrawal to a more defensible security perimeter at the Orange River and the Botswana-South African border. Such a sense of responsibility is reflected in the genuine pride taken in the army's civic action program, the training of a Namibian defense force and police with high standards, and the Afrikaner commitment to maintaining standards in the civil service and the schools.

Even more basic are South African security and economic interests in Namibia. The army does not want to retreat to a shorter defensive perimeter nor to

give up its large bases in Walvis Bay. The South African corporate stake in Namibian mineral exploitation, especially in uranium, is great. In addition, there is a genuine fear of a Marxist regime next door and the realization that South Africa can realize its goals in Namibia with small amounts of money and manpower. This stands in sharp contrast to the large cost and level of effort it would have taken if South Africa were to have realized its preferred options in Mozambique in 1974-1975, for example.

APARTHEID

Besides, the South African government is embattled at home as well as abroad. While the emotional foreign campaigns against apartheid let up in 1979—when attention was focused on the peripheries of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Namibia rather than on the heartland—still Western pressure nudged internal reforms along. This was constructive; more and more Afrikaners came to realize the wisdom of Prime Minister Botha's adage, "adapt or die," and to understand that change is almost unavoidable.

Sooner or later, however, Washington and London must recognize that the Afrikaners in and out of government have a narrow view of "acceptable" change. Officials and the electorate at large see only a few limited possible changes that will not unravel the entire political, social, economic and security system in a way that might eventually endanger their existence.

At present, the political pull inside South Africa is to the right rather than to the left. The pillars of National party support consist of three powerful elements all tugging to the right: farmers, whose electoral importance is exaggerated by constituency boundaries; unions, which fear and oppose black economic advances; and government employees, who are numerous and overwhelmingly Afrikaner.

Lurking behind the political facts of life in South Africa are odious threats of violence from well-armed, fanatical right-wing whites. Since the 1960's, some 1,600 unsolved crimes have been committed against government critics, presumably committed by right-wing whites. Given this squalid record, many South African officials fear white violence arising from the dismantling of apartheid more than they fear black violence arising from its perpetuation.

Fears of change soon overcome forces of change; this will become increasingly evident as the Western eye moves from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Namibia to the center stage of South Africa. ■

Kenneth L. Adelman lived and studied in Africa between 1972 and 1975 and returned in 1976 and 1979. He was assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 1976-1977 and is a frequent writer on African politics and U.S. foreign policy.

¹The term refers to whites of Dutch descent who rule South Africa.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AFRICANA DICTIONARY OF AFRICAN BIOGRAPHY, VOLUME II: SIERRA LEONE—ZAIRE. *Directed by L.H. Ofosu-Appiah.* (Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications Inc., 1979. 372 pages, maps, pictures, glossary of names and terms and index, \$59.95.)

This is the second of the projected 20-volume set to be produced by the Encyclopedia Africana Project in Accra, Ghana. It contains biographies of 137 Sierra Leoneans and 102 Zairians, along with excellent maps and pictures that add a great deal of information to the text.

There are excellent historical and factual introductions to each of the two sections which place the biographies in historical and political perspective. The introductions also describe the socioeconomic trends in the development of the two countries through colonialism to independence.

The biographies are arranged in alphabetical order, and the very comprehensive index makes it easy to find the important associations of the biographee.

As was true of the first volume of the project, the writing is scholarly and interesting and covers many people not well known in this country. It is to be hoped that the remaining volumes of the encyclopedia will follow promptly. O.E.S.

MODERN AFRICA, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY. *By Richard W. Hull.* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980. 274 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$9.95, paper.)

Richard Hull writes of sub-Saharan African civilizations, their past and present, with particular emphasis on the period beginning with the last quarter of the 19th century. His aim is to increase our understanding of Africa by setting today's Africa in "an historical/institutional context," and to show how African civilization has enriched world civilization.

The text is divided into broad sections including patterns of authority in pre-colonial, colonial and independence eras; "economic horizons"; and cultural patterns. This offers the reader an excellent opportunity to compare different cultures. Hull believes that "African culture has enriched both Africans and people living in foreign lands. It is indeed the continent's greatest contribution to the world." This is an extremely readable and scholarly book. O.E.S.

MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA. *By John P. Renninger.* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1979. 161 pages, appendix, notes, selected bibliography and index, \$16.00.)

John Renninger writes about the cooperative arrangements that have come into being in West Africa since the 1960's, particularly in the field of economic development, aimed at making the countries of West Africa economically and politically independent. Renninger concludes that a strong commitment at the top, disregarding the immediate cost for a long-range gain, is necessary to the success of cooperation and integration and that West African "unity" must at some point be accepted by West Africans themselves. O.E.S.

EUROPE AND AFRICA: FROM ASSOCIATION TO PARTNERSHIP. *By Carol Cosgrove-Twitchett.* (Brookfield, Vermont: Renouf U.S.A., Inc., 1979. 212 pages, appendices, selected bibliography and index, \$25.50.)

This book outlines and explains the relationships between the West European (EEC) countries and the developing countries of Africa. O.E.S.

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: 1785-1975. *Compiled by Julian W. Witherell.* (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 1978. 949 pages and index, \$14.75.)

This selection of publications issued by or for the United States government from 1785 to September, 1975, is an invaluable book for the African scholar. Some 8,827 documents are listed, divided into five chronological sections; the last and most extensive covers the 1952-1975 period. Each listing is briefly described and the index is detailed and comprehensive. O.E.S.

SOUTHERN AFRICA. *Edited by Grant S. McClellan.* (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1979. 272 pages and bibliography, \$5.75, paper.)

Grant McClellan offers an interesting selection of articles on Southern Africa. O.E.S.

THE STATE AND REVOLUTION IN EASTERN AFRICA. *By John S. Saul.* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979. 454 pages and index, \$16.00.)

John Saul analyzes the politics and the inequalities that impede the progress of the countries in eastern Africa. O.E.S. ■

THE RETURN OF CIVILIAN RULE IN NIGERIA AND GHANA

(Continued from page 118)

Kano and Kaduna. And, a group of northern "heavy-weights" from the old core Hausa-Fulani states of the north formed the National party of Nigeria (NPN), the only party without a pre-selected leader. The NPN established the broadest base of any of the parties, with overwhelming support in four core Hausa-Fulani northern states, two northern middle belt states, and two minority (non-Ibo) southeastern states. Indeed, it demonstrated dramatic national support when it won majorities in four of the five elections in eight of the nineteen states and tended to run second in another ten states. The NPN's broad multistate support clearly distinguished it from the dominant northern party of the first republic. However, the UPN and the NPP reflected sharp regional cleavages, winning massive majorities in the predominantly Yoruba and Ibo states, respectively, though the NPP also won support in the northern plateau state. Shehu Shagari, a former teacher and minister in the first republic and finance minister under Gowon, was chosen to be the NPN presidential candidate. Shagari, a man of wide political and government experience, won the presidency and has shown confidence and strength in his first tests.

The party platforms did not differ greatly although the UPN's platform expressed more socialist intentions than its many business leaders are likely to manifest. But the election campaign threatened a series of crises that were only narrowly averted, not to mention the characteristic accusations of voter fraud. First, the NPP's Azikiwe and the PRP's Aminu were declared ineligible to run for President because of their failure to show past income tax payments (as were other candidates for lesser posts), a decision both candidates overturned in court. When the NPN showed continuing strength in the assembly elections, Awolowo unsuccessfully tried to assemble a coalition of parties to stop Shagari in the presidential election. Success could have meant Awolowo's electoral college victory, because he came in second in the presidential voting. Lastly, the NPN's Shagari won 33.8 percent of the presidential vote but won one-fourth of the vote in only 12 of the 19 states, less than the necessary two-thirds. FEDECO, however, ruled that two-thirds of 19 was two-thirds of 18 states plus two-thirds of one-fourth of the vote in a nineteenth state and declared Shehu Shagari the presidential winner. Several parties contested this decision, which the Supreme Court affirmed only days before Shagari's inauguration.

However, the NPN did not have a majority in the Federal House and Senate. The weeks after Shagari's inauguration involved delicate negotiations for "coop-

eration," in which Azikiwe's NPP decided to support the NPN in return for policy concession and Cabinet seats.

Shagari's government is likely to be fairly conservative but nationalist. In his first months in office, Shagari announced that there would be no change in the military government's austerity spending and import policies until the next budget year. He stated that Nigeria would continue to play a vigorous role in inter-African politics, though he is likely to be more cautious than his military predecessors, who abruptly cut oil supplies to Chad and Ghana in order to exert leverage on their policies, threatened the United States with an oil cut-off if it recognized the "internal settlement" in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and nationalized British Petroleum.

GHANA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

In Ghana, eight years of rule by General I.K. Acheampong's Supreme Military Council (SMC) left the Ghanaian economy so devastated that it is difficult to foresee any near-term recovery. In the late 1960's Ghana had an economy still dependent on cocoa exports for over 60 percent of its foreign exchange; but cocoa production, like gold and diamond mining, was declining. The state inherited from the Nkrumah regime a declining but still important private sector, in which an indigenous bourgeoisie struggled for a share with foreign capital; a large state sector, comprising local and national government and many state manufacturing and agricultural corporations, which were neither very productive nor profitable but were recovering; and an agricultural sector, increasingly abandoned by youth and adult males, in which domestic food and export agriculture was declining; and a heavy burden of external indebtedness. The bourgeois-led civilian Progress party government of 1969-1972 sought to reinvigorate the economy by stimulating the private sector, with special incentives to agriculture and to Ghanaian business. Acheampong subsequently seized power, taking advantage of widespread popular opposition to the government's austerity measures and the devaluation of 1971, made necessary by a decline in world cocoa prices.

Acheampong sought to legitimate his military rule and stimulate development by a variety of measures: economic nationalism, involving debt repudiation (hence little future capital inflows), state majority ownership of all major mining (gold, diamonds), insurance and banking, and an indigenization program like Nigeria's (from which the elite also benefited); a reimposition of state controls over the economy (import licensing, price controls); programs to increase production, especially in agriculture, where the popular Operation Feed Yourself Program initially increased agricultural production but ultimately failed by allocating subsidies and most bank credit to

inefficient state organizations and to large private farmers, neglecting the small peasant producers; and measures to maintain falling living standards (a revaluation of the currency, price and rent controls, rationalized food distribution).

Although external factors (oil price increases, inflated import costs) and natural disasters (repeated droughts in the north) severely hampered the economy, the Acheampong regime's policies and performance were responsible for Ghana's disastrous impoverishment.² Repudiating the skills of the bourgeois-professional class leadership whose government he overthrew, Acheampong gave leadership positions to military officers in all sectors of Ghana's government and state corporations, in order to broaden SMC support within the military. The military demonstrated that it was incompetent to run government and corporate institutions; instead, it succumbed to opportunities for personal enrichment as quickly as civilian politicians. By the mid- and late 1970's massive corruption had undermined the economy; corruption was so blatantly public that popular support was severely eroded. From 1975 on, increasingly large government budget deficits fueled the inflation; thus it exceeded 100 percent in 1977-1978. Balance of payments problems and mismanaged and corrupt import licensing led to persistent shortages in both essential consumer commodities and manufacturing inputs (60 percent of which are imported) and to an underground black market economy. The vastly over-valued currency stimulated large smuggling and black market trade in scarce imports. As opposition to his policies and regime performance increased, notably from the middle-class bourgeois-professionals whom he had ousted and who scorned military leadership, Acheampong's government resorted to frantic populist measures to rationalize the distribution of scarce food and consumer commodities. It attacked the market women who dominate retail trade and thus it further disrupted market channels.

GHANA'S RETURN TO CIVILIAN POWER

Ghana's path back to civilian democratic power was much more turbulent and erratic than Nigeria's. The leaders of Ghana's first military regime (1966-1969) had pledged a rapid return to civilian rule, and they kept their word, despite a series of conflicts and problems. However, Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong, who seized power in 1972 with a small cadre of supporters, did not pledge to return power to democratic civilian rule. Sustained agitation and protests on the part of important civilian groups were required to crack the military solidarity supporting General Acheampong. The first steps were

taken when Acheampong, under public pressure, proposed a form of "union government" that would have enabled the military and police to play a direct role in government and would not have permitted political parties, which were condemned as "divisive." Acheampong created a committee to draft proposals for a union government, which the Ghana Bar Association denounced as a fraud. Sustained university student protest against the Acheampong government began in early 1977, and students were joined by lawyers and other professional associations in a 19-day strike in June, 1977, which forced Acheampong to concede a return to civilian rule (but under "union government") in two years, by July, 1979. Despite the ban on parties, political groups formed to contest the referendum on the union government proposals in March, 1978. Acheampong's government threw all its resources into the campaign, intimidated the opposition, and only won 55 percent of the vote when it resorted to fraud and intimidation. Post-election repression led to renewed strikes by students and lawyers until Acheampong was removed at the instigation of medium rank officers, who recoiled at the military's repressive role and the political polarization in the country.

The successor Supreme Military Council (SMC II) government under General Fred Akuffo tried to stabilize the situation by promising to return civilian rule by July, 1979, by removing senior officers most closely associated with Acheampong (but neither arresting nor prosecuting them), and by offering new places on a Constitutional Drafting Commission created by Acheampong to which opposition leaders had refused appointment. The Akuffo government also undertook the necessary drastic measures to stabilize Ghana's shattered economy, conforming to the deflationary measures required by the International Monetary Fund that reduced real government spending and devalued the cedi by 139 percent in exchange for IMF loans. The consequence was an immediate enormous increase in inflation and a shortage of imports, which prompted over 80 strikes in three months, inducing the government to declare a state of emergency. The political challenges and the drastic inflation animated intense public pressure against Akuffo's regime, which was primarily intent on beating an orderly retreat and protecting the military against popular wrath. Hence, the Akuffo government increasingly gave way to demands for public inquiries into government institutions, for a constitution which permitted political parties, and an end of the ban on parties (January, 1979).

District council elections (with low voter turnout) took place in December, 1978. District councils then nominated members to a Constituent Assembly, as did the government. The Constituent Assembly met

(Continued on page 137)

²World cocoa prices have been high through much of the 1970's.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 101)

Although the United Nations Commission on Human Rights broke the official silence on Uganda in 1978, and despite Amin's growing isolation among African heads of state, the OAU studiously continued a policy of embarrassing silence. It was Tanzania, in a joint military effort with Ugandan exiles, which toppled Amin in April, 1979. Tanzania's military invasion came after severe provocation by Amin, whose troops had invaded and seized the Kagera salient of northern Tanzania. The Ugandan forces turned on the local Tanzanian populace with the same barbarity that they used against their own people. Thousands of Tanzanians "disappeared."

Once Amin was removed, Tanzanian and Ugandan forces began to display the records of Amin's terror and to show the death camps like Makindye Prison. The proof of Amin's human rights violations was overwhelming, creating tremendous pressure on the OAU to respond to earlier charges by Tanzania and others that the continent's official silence had been tantamount to condoning Amin's horrors. The Uganda case, once the facts were bared, forced the hands of African leaders. But there was also Equatorial Guinea and Emperor Bokassa, and both of these situations added to the pressures. As a result, Africans had to accept the fact that the OAU had to address human rights in addition to its condemnation of violations in southern Africa.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Problems began in Equatorial Guinea on July 14, 1972, when newly elected President Macias Nguema declared himself President for life and awarded himself 45 other titles. Between 1972 and his removal from power in 1979, under Macias's administration one-third of the country's population either fled or was killed. Amnesty International reported that arbitrary detentions and killings characterized Macias rule. In particular, intellectuals and members of the Bubi ethnic group suffered. Macias favored his own Fang ethnics, although they were not spared his terror.

Prison conditions in Equatorial Guinea were unusually harsh. Detainees were beaten severely when

they arrived and afterward. The methods of torture used by Macias's henchmen included "hanging prisoners in chains which cut through their flesh, and pouring [gasoline] into open wounds."¹⁹

The Macias government also engaged in forced labor, described by outsiders as slavery. Many Nigerian workers who labored on cocoa plantations were repatriated from Fernando Poo island because of their brutal treatment. The labor shortage which resulted in 1976/1977 led Macias to recruit Guineans forcibly to replace the more than 40,000 Nigerians. Macias's guards arrested between 2,000 and 2,500 people in each mainland province to provide unpaid labor on the cocoa plantations.²⁰

In July, 1976, human rights violations committed by Macias were noted at the International Conference for the Rights of People at Algiers, and the regime was condemned at the pan-African conference on the death penalty at Ibadan, Nigeria, in October, 1977. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights condemned Equatorial Guinea in March, 1979, and decided to send one of its members, a Costa Rican, to investigate human rights conditions in the country.²¹ At the July, 1979, OAU Summit, the new Ugandan head of state publicly condemned Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Empire but his fellow heads of state had the remarks stricken from the official record. It is ironic that this was done at the same meeting that passed a resolution calling for a human rights charter, and that a few weeks later Macias was toppled from power. He was placed on trial September 24, and executed shortly thereafter.

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

In 1965, Jean Bedel Bokassa seized power from his cousin, David Dacko; in December, 1976, he was crowned emperor. Bokassa was an erratic ruler who impoverished his country by profligate spending and self-indulgence. The emperor engaged in beating prisoners, and fundamental rights under his rule were rarely respected. In summer, 1977, a British journalist was arrested, and later, was assaulted personally by Emperor Bokassa. However, the worst scandal was an allegation that Bokassa had participated in the massacre of more than 100 schoolchildren in April, 1979.

In January, 1979, Bokassa ordered schoolchildren to wear uniforms. The uniforms were too costly, and Bokassa controlled their production and sale. Demonstrations against the order developed into more general protests against the government. The demonstrations were suppressed brutally, and Amnesty International reported that observers claimed that between 400 and 500 people were killed.²² Unrest spread to other parts of the country. In April, 1979, there were arrests in and around the capital city, Bangui, as government troops searched for a student leader

¹⁹Amnesty International, *Report 1979* (London, 1979), p. 17.

²⁰Suzanna Cronjé, *Equatorial Guinea: The Forgotten Dictatorship* (London: Anti-Slavery Society, 1976), p. 18.

²¹*Press Communiqué*, National Alliance for Democratic Restoration, August 10, 1979.

²²Amnesty International, *Recent Human Rights Violations in the Central African Empire*, June 26, 1979; *Publication of International Commission of Inquiry's Report on Events in Bangui (Central African Empire)*, August 28, 1979.

alleged to have organized the January demonstrations. On April 9, students struck in protest against the arrests. Student meetings were organized and continued to be held, clandestinely, during the week of April 10-18. Bokassa responded by ordering the arrest and murder of about 100 schoolchildren.

In May, the francophone African states held their sixth annual Franco-African summit at Kigali in Rwanda. The participating states created a special commission of inquiry to investigate the alleged killings in the Central African Empire. Five senior African jurists were selected from Ivory Coast, Liberia, Rwanda, Togo and Senegal under the leadership of the Senegalese member. They visited the Central African Empire and issued a report on August 16, 1979, confirming the killings and stating that Bokassa was implicated. The Commission's 133-page report and annexes constitute a precedent in African diplomacy, preceding the OAU meeting at Monrovia in July, 1979. On September 20, Bokassa was toppled by a joint French-Central African coup that restored David Dacko to power.

The Central Africa report demonstrated that African states could review human rights violations in an objective manner and that charges issued by human rights organizations were not to be dismissed as mere fabrications. Senegal, one of the sponsoring states of the OAU resolution, recalled its ambassador from the Central African Empire after the report was issued.

ON THE POSITIVE SIDE

The very negative record in African protection of human rights in the 1960's and 1970's contrasts sharply with developments in the past three years. Military regimes in Ghana, Nigeria and Upper Volta have yielded to popular pressures to return to a multiparty civilian political system. Military Presidents have either eased their control or civilianized their rule in Burundi, Mali and Rwanda. Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere has acted to end the repressive aspects of his regime, liberating political prisoners and rolling back several socialist policies. Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry has worked hard to reconcile the north and south and to encourage political opponents to return. Guinea's President Sékou Toure has eased up on arbitrary arrests and economic pressures inside the country. Senegalese President Leopold Senghor has opened up the Senegalese political system by allowing other political parties to be formed. In Mauritania, the regime has taken pains to drop internal policies which were exacerbating ethnic tension and has decided not to try to annex the southern part of Western Sahara. Amin, Bokassa and Macias have disappeared from the political stage.

The season of Caesars may not have ended in

Africa, but it is no longer the dominant direction of African events. The continent that René Dumont lamented as "mal partie" (off to a bad start) has recognized its own problems. The fact that Africa has not come close to any development goals set at independence and the violence which has become all too commonplace within African borders have sobered many Africans who are willing to accept the fact that moral issues and how people are treated are central concerns for any country whose government has an honest interest in development and nation-building. Both tasks require the collaboration of the population; little progress is possible where there is only a passive acceptance of a regime without any identification with its leaders and its policies. This truism is gaining currency in Africa as the 1980's begin; in the 1980's, Africans will in all likelihood pay more attention to human rights and the human aspects of development.

PROBLEMS PERSIST

The more positive outlook generated in the past three years does not negate the fact that Africans still face serious problems; there are African countries where human rights continue to be violated on a serious scale, including Ethiopia, Benin, Chad, Guinea, Malawi, Lesotho, Burundi, Togo, Zaire, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. There are still major problems in Uganda, and there is some question as to whether or not human rights will fare better under the new rulers in Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic.

Throughout Africa, there are also serious economic problems. And in many countries, even where civilian rule has returned, there are army officers waiting in the wings for a moment to return to power.

From September 10 to 21, 1979, a United Nations seminar was held at Monrovia, Liberia, where African experts gathered to consider the creation of a human rights commission. They produced a 15-article draft which was transmitted to the OAU for its consideration. On November 29, 1979, Dakar hosted the first working session of the OAU experts charged with drafting an African charter of human rights and the rights of peoples. The sessions lasted through December 8, and a draft was produced, which, *inter alia*, calls for (1) the promotion of understanding and respect for human rights; (2) assistance to OAU member states in codifying human rights law; (3) creation of a regional human rights commission. This draft will be reviewed at least once more by OAU experts before it is placed before the heads of state at the 1980 OAU summit in July, 1980.

The OAU draft is not so strong as some human rights activists expected it to be. Independent of its content and scope, the important and decided factor will be whether or not effective machinery is estab-

lished to translate the interest in human rights into actual protection. African lawyers, local African chapters of human rights groups like Amnesty International, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and various national groups as well as African human rights centers have begun to coordinate action to make sure that the OAU does come up with effective machinery. They plan to lobby much as do their counterparts in Europe and the Americas.

It may be recalled that the Americas' regional human rights body did not become effective until more than a decade after its creation. Africa may not prove to be that different. Despite this, the OAU's decision to adopt a human rights document will legitimize the consideration of human rights by Africans and by outsiders when there is a question of violation anywhere on the African continent.

OAU Secretary-General Edem Kodjo referred to the November 29, 1979, meeting of the group of experts as the "beginning of a new era." He may have overstated the facts but he set a tone in his opening remarks:

Of course, the Africa which freed so many nations that share its space, today intends to liberate peoples . . . its peoples . . . and complete the long process of self-affirmation which is an unprecedented effort.

Here we are with established proof that there is no real development without fundamental human rights, without individual participation, without minimal freedom of thought and action.

Africa will be strengthened in its own dignity and honor (with a human rights charter and mechanisms to implement it). [Africa] will be better able to have its voice heard when [Africa] shouts its refusal to the hatred and oppression in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.²³

²³*Le Soleil* (Senegal), November 30, 1979, p. 4.

POPULATION GROWTH AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 106)

lation growth: Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco and Tunisia. The three islands of Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles have the most successful family planning programs in Africa with birthrates and death rates of less than 27 and 8 per thousand respectively. Their success is mainly due to their high literacy rate, their small highly urbanized population and a relatively higher standard of living. These nine countries comprise only 21 percent of Africa's population. On the other extreme, 11 countries encourage population growth or consider their rate of population growth acceptable, and 14 others have neither population policies nor organized family planning services. These 25 countries comprise about 20 percent of

Africa's population. The other African countries, comprising about 60 percent of the continent's population, have privately run or government-administered family planning services. Most of these family planning services are very small scale, and their impact on the level of fertility is negligible.

Even the six African countries that have embarked on a policy to limit their population have not yet shown significant results. All six countries introduced the programs during the decade from 1960 to 1970. Egypt and Tunisia each had a population growth rate of 2.6 percent for 1979, compared to 2.4 percent for Egypt and 2.2 percent for Tunisia in 1975. This is an impressive performance, especially when compared to the population growth of the other four countries—Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and Morocco—which had a growth rate of over 3 percent in 1979. Kenya's population growth rate, even with its family planning program, is one of the highest in the world, with a 3.8 percent annual growth rate in 1979, doubling the population in 18 years. The population growth rate is not only a function of the birthrate, which has been fairly steady in all six countries, but also of the death rate, which has shown considerable decline in all six countries. In fact, a growth rate can be attributed more to the lowering of the death rate than to the increase in birthrate. Thus, a successfully implemented family planning program is a long-term program of stemming population growth. For instance, the Ghanaian family planning program was organized in 1970 and started services in 1971 with the objective of slowing population growth to 1.7 percent annually by the year 2000. Population projections to 1985 showed that there would be very little or no impact of family planning programs on fertility. Assuming that Ghana is able to reduce its fertility rate by nearly 50 percent between 1985 and 2000, its population would double in the next 26 years.¹⁸

There is, therefore, a long and complex series of steps between an interest in family planning and an actual decline in the birthrate. Experiences both in the short-term and long-term in Puerto Rico and India have shown that even the most intensive efforts do not produce marked changes rapidly; but these experiments in fertility limitation have provided valuable insight into the organization and administration of family planning programs. African countries that have not yet introduced the program have a long way to go; in the meantime their population growth rate will continue unimpeded.

The fast rate of population growth is regarded as a serious problem by the leaders of many African countries, but fertility control is nowhere assigned a high priority. The population problem is only one of many problems that face African countries who are trying to meet development targets and objectives,

¹⁸S.K. Gaisie and A.S. David, *Planned Fertility Reduction in Ghana* (Legon: University of Ghana, 1974), Chapter 2.

including nationwide primary education, health services and housing, job opportunities, a transportation system, and a modicum of efficiency in the bureaucracy. Even assuming that the population problem is recognized as the most challenging task, a government confronting inflation, a lack or shortage of funds, unemployment, political instability, secession and irredentism finds it extremely difficult and expensive to deal with fertility limitation.

In many parts of Africa, including Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Libya and Malawi, there is a strong feeling that a large labor force is a productive element in national development, especially in view of the increasing demand for labor in subsistence and commercial agriculture and mining. There is an assumption that rapid population growth is the foundation for a more powerful military establishment, an economically advantageous internal market, and a pool of cheap labor. Many elites in Africa contend that developed nations hope to solve the problem of population growth not by restricting their own use of resources or further reducing their rate of population growth, but by asking the developing countries to restrict their population growth. Some African leaders believe that those who advocate fertility control are in fact perpetuating the economic dependency of Africa.

Therefore, official emphasis is placed on attaining a faster pace of national economic growth to achieve higher standards of living. Greater emphasis is placed on reducing mortality and morbidity than on the reduction of fertility which, it is argued, would decline given better income distribution and higher standards of living. African governments vary a great deal in their attitudes toward population growth, some governments actively encourage population growth while the others encourage fertility limitation, with various shades of opinion in between. ■

THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN RHODESIA

(Continued from page 109)

the unwillingness of the new Conservative government in Britain to rush toward recognition. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had campaigned on a platform to lift sanctions immediately, responded to Commonwealth and Nigerian pressures to push aggressively for an all-parties conference.

Nor was all going well for the guerrilla movements. Nkomo and Mugabe had failed again to consolidate their military operations under a single command. There was continuing deep-seated mistrust between ZANU and ZAPU, the two wings of the Patriotic Front, as well as divisions within the two movements. ZANU was particularly susceptible to factionalism; and a number of internal revolts had led to the detention of some of its most prominent members.

Moreover, in July, Robert Mugabe and Abel Muzorewa were both losing mass support. Both leaders are Shona, and 80 percent of the war's fighting and devastation had occurred in Shona lands. The peasants were growing impatient with the long war and neither the guerrillas nor the government had won their hearts and minds. Joshua Nkomo, too, was nervous over the progress of the struggle. The Soviet Union had shifted its support toward the more Marxist-leaning Mugabe and were supplying him with sophisticated weapons. Hitherto, Nkomo had received the vast bulk of the Soviet Union's military largesse. ZANU and ZAPU were increasing the size of their forces inside the country; by July, ZANU had some 12,000 within the borders and ZAPU boasted 3,000. Thereafter, the two armies, with their separate commands, began to compete and to clash for territory. This raised the specter of a civil war.

The neighboring African nations, on whose territories the guerrillas were based, were also suffering from the devastations of the war. The conflict had raised Zambia's debt to over \$1 billion. With foreign exchange down to almost nothing, the nation was approaching bankruptcy. And all this over a war which, in the long run, would not benefit Zambia directly. Zambia was in dire need of maize and fertilizer and could only obtain them from South Africa via Rhodesia railways. Zambia's business community bristled under the growing presence of well-armed ZAPU troops who behaved like an army of occupation and incurred the periodic wrath of Rhodesian bombers.

Mozambique's decision to close its borders with Rhodesia in 1976 was costing its treasury between \$100 million and \$200 million yearly in lost transit fees and commerce. Samora Machel, the Mozambican President, and Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia, yearned for an end to the conflict so that they could rebuild their shattered economies. But how could all these parties openly sue for peace without suffering a severe loss of face?

The answer came on August 5, when the 39 heads of delegations to the British Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, approved a British proposal calling for a cease-fire, a new constitution, and a new election supervised by the British government. The war-weary African front-line states, on the verge of bankruptcy and at the urging of Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, accepted the idea. Rhodesia's whites, Bishop Muzorewa, and the Patriotic Front were caught off guard by this sudden turn of events, and Muzorewa and Smith concluded that all hope of international recognition for their Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had evaporated. If the Conservative government in Britain would not recognize them, no one would. Kaunda made it clear to Nkomo that the Zambian economy could no longer afford to be at odds with its

southern neighbor, and Nyerere was able to convince Mugabe that he too must swallow the British plan.

Consequently, on September 10, British-sponsored all-parties talks began at Lancaster House. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was doomed as a nation, and its government launched devastating deep cross-border preemptive raids into Zambia and Mozambique, intended to pressure them to force the Patriotic Front into a more flexible negotiating position. No longer were targets limited to guerrilla camps. Rhodesian aircraft zeroed in on 12 major bridges in Zambia and on the rice-growing areas in Mozambique's fertile Limpopo valley. By early October, all of Zambia's routes to the outside world, except through Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, had been severed. In effect, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was waging all-out war on both neighbors, and in some instances in Mozambique the forces of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia engaged that nation's army in direct combat. These attacks were not designed to conquer or to seize territory but to deprive ZANU and ZAPU of supplies and to destroy the routes of infiltration that they might use during the transition period.

A TRANSITION

These tactics, savage as they were, apparently bore fruit; on October 3 Britain presented a detailed proposal for a new constitution, and the Patriotic Front was told by the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, to agree to it or accept the responsibility for destroying the peace conference. By mid-November, Lord Carrington, with Kaunda's assistance, had persuaded the Patriotic Front leaders and the Muzorewa regime to accept both the independence constitution and a transition formula.

And so the convoluted story came full circle, with Lord Soames arriving in Salisbury on December 12 to the tune of "God Save the Queen." Nineteen seventy-nine was an exceptional year for Rhodesia, with an outcome that no one would have predicted 12 months earlier. In a relatively brief time, that tragic land suffered three agonizing and fundamentally different regimes, only to be humiliated when it became the only country in modern history to return to colonial status. Then again, some observers could argue that Rhodesia had always been a British Crown Colony.

As Rhodesia moves into the 1980's, it is by no means certain that the crisis has ended. Some observers believe that Rhodesia has only entered the quiet eye of the storm. Many fundamental and potentially explosive issues remain: disarmament, land redistribution, and the clash of race, ethnicity, ideology and personality. It will take much more than a new constitution, free elections and a government with democratic institutions to restore normalcy to this strife-torn country, so rich in natural resources and yet so poor in goodwill and mutual trust. ■

CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 123)

widespread attention, only a few highlights will be cited here.

In a situation remarkably parallel to the American Watergate incident, a top contender for N.P. leadership and thus for Prime Minister, Connie Mulder (then Minister of Plural Affairs but formerly Minister of Information) resigned from the Cabinet in November, 1978, when he became implicated in a scandal. Apparently about \$73 million in government funds was used to fund a network of 138 covert operations. The three men involved (according to the Erasmus Commission report in June, 1979) were Mulder, Eschel Rhoodie, former Information Secretary, and General Hendrick van den Bergh, former chief of the intelligence agency known as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). The operation was staged in part to buy favorable publicity for South African policy by purchasing or investing in foreign and South African news media. Other money, according to Rhoodie (the John Dean of "Muldergate"), went to campaigns for and against American politicians, usually through front men. Still other funds found their way to sources who would buy pro-South Africa newspaper advertisements in West Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States.²⁸

President B. J. Vorster (Prime Minister for over a dozen years until his resignation late in 1978 for "health" reasons) did not deny that (as Prime Minister) he had been aware of some of the purposes of the fund, but the Erasmus Commission found that he had been guilty of a cover-up and that he had lied about his knowledge of some projects. Subsequently Vorster, the once feared Minister of Justice under Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd, resigned from the presidency, driven out in part by the tenacious exposures of the reporters and editors of the *Rand Daily Mail*.

The consequences of the "Muldergate" incident were substantial, but less weakening than Botha feared. At one point it appeared that the Prime Minister himself might be implicated by the Erasmus Commission and forced to resign, but this did not happen. Elements of his party's right-wing still resent Botha, especially in the Transvaal where Mulder had been the party's leader. Had Mulder beaten Botha for the party leadership in 1978—as he almost did—the whole incident would probably have been effectively covered up. In addition, the slightly more liberal

²⁸One midwestern United States coffee company owner spent many thousands of dollars over several years to purchase artistic and dramatic full-page advertisements in newspapers in Chicago, Dallas, St. Louis, Washington, and Los Angeles, among other places, promoting positions consistent with South African propaganda. No advertisements have appeared since the scandal was exposed.

Botha had alienated the party's right-wing. The new Transvaal leader and head of the NP's conservative faction, Andries Treurnicht, was added to the Cabinet as Minister of Public Works, Statistics and Tourism, a very low-level position.

Thus Botha's government did not receive rousing majorities in by-elections in 1979. Thousands of NP supporters stayed home during the August 29 by-elections in the Transvaal Province, either out of confusion over party policy direction or in protest. The voter turnout was only 40 percent, one of the lowest in South Africa's history. The NP majority dropped from 5,749 to 2,465 in one upper-class area of Johannesburg, while the Progressive Federal party (PFP) doubled its vote totals. In a blue collar area near Pretoria, the NP majority dropped from 6,870 to 1,737, while the extreme right-wing Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP) trebled its votes in comparison to its 1977 showing. Similar results occurred in four October by-elections, also in the Transvaal. While the NP won all four seats, the HNP came within 846 votes of winning its first parliamentary seat. Moreover the 34 percent voting turnout was the lowest in the 69-year history of South Africa. Mulder claimed that this was a vote of no confidence in all the parties, and he has threatened to leave the NP and form a splinter party to oppose Botha.

NAMIBIA

The one truly international issue to involve South Africa currently is the impending political change in the territory formerly known as South-West Africa but recognized by the United Nations as Namibia. South Africa administered the territory after the League of Nations gave it mandate status in December, 1920, and resisted its transfer to United Nations supervision as a Trust Territory. The major African political party, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) began a guerrilla resistance movement in 1966, while continuing to press its claims through the United Nations. To counter SWAPO, South Africa called a constitutional conference in 1975, but invited ethnic leaders (in conjunction with its Separate Development concept) instead of political parties like SWAPO. Constitutional proposals emerged from this conference, as did a multi-racial alliance of parties, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), whose most prominent spokesman is a former member of South Africa's National party, Dirk Mudge. The DTA is described by many reporters as "moderate," a word that fits only insofar as it falls somewhere between white right-wingers who are pro-South African segregationists and the SWAPO organization led by Sam Nujoma. (The latter looks more extreme than it is because it was forced to turn to guerrilla warfare by the intransigence of South Africa.) In fact, the DTA represents political

groups that have demonstrated little mass support and whose "leaders" are mostly powerless traditionalists guided by South African constitutional law specialists.

Nevertheless, in December, 1978, South Africa supervised elections for a constituent assembly in Namibia, which were boycotted by SWAPO and most other political parties and which the United Nations declared to be null and void. DTA campaigned against the minimal opposition of four right-wing fringe parties, and won 41 of the 50 seats. The DTA thus continues to represent what South Africa considers the elected voice of the Namibian people.

Meanwhile, the United Nations, led by a group of states referred to as the Western Five (United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Canada), has attempted to persuade South Africa and SWAPO to agree to a plan that will allow United Nations-supervised elections. On December 22, 1978, South Africa presented Secretary General Kurt Waldheim with a set of proposals. Waldheim countered on January 3, 1979, with a proposal for a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) of 7,500 troops and 1,000 civilians to supervise elections and a transition to independence. At one point, a cease-fire was proposed. However South Africa and SWAPO both had serious reservations about parts of the plan.

Thus in 1979 there was a series of negotiations among all parties involved. "Proximity talks" (where the opposing sides meet with third parties, near each other but not in the same room) were held in New York in March. South Africa's greatest objections involved the provisions that would allow SWAPO bases in Namibia—which could be used to sabotage elections—and the failure of the plan to allow adequate monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighboring Angola.

Meanwhile, in May, South Africa transformed Namibia's constituent assembly into a National Assembly with some internal governing powers. The Pretoria government maintained, however, that this was not a step toward a unilateral declaration of independence. In August, Botha replaced a comparatively moderate Namibian administrator, Judge Marthinus Steyn, with Gerrit Viljoen, president of the Broederbond, the most prestigious secret society for "super Afrikaners." While most observers saw this as hardening South Africa's position in the negotiations, some saw a possible advantage. Any agreement acceptable to Viljoen, an Afrikaner "purer than pure," could not be easily opposed by Afrikaners either in South Africa or Namibia.

A major break in the stalemate occurred in August, 1979, when Angolan President Agostinho Neto (a supporter of SWAPO and regarded as a radical by South Africa) proposed the creation of a demilitarized

zone 60 miles long and 900 miles wide on the Angolan-Namibian border. Neto's other concessions (upheld by his successors after his death from cancer shortly thereafter) included the abandonment of SWAPO bases in Namibia in exchange for four SWAPO bases in Angola and one in Zambia. Guerrillas still in Namibia after the cease-fire could either go to those bases or hand over their weapons and remain there. South Africa would be allowed to retain five bases in Namibia for three months. Proximity talks on this basis were to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning November 12. South Africa agreed to come only if the parties represented in the National Assembly were also allowed to attend.

Following the Geneva meetings, the world awaited Botha's reaction. In early December, South Africa accepted the demilitarized zone concept with six reservations, including the condition that South Africa be allowed to keep bases within the demilitarized zone. The reservations did not please either the United Nations negotiators or SWAPO, although optimistic observers believe that South Africa's reaction is subject to further negotiation.

The key to a settlement in Namibia may be a peaceful resolution of the Zimbabwe situation. If the February elections are held and the cease-fire holds in Zimbabwe, South Africa may be more willing to accept a United Nations-supervised election in Namibia. Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher believes that a Zimbabwe settlement will lead to a resolution of South Africa's problems. She has prophesied that there is a potential for an end to "the isolation of South Africa in world affairs." South Africa must be considered next, she said, noting "welcome initiatives in South Africa's domestic affairs." Thatcher is an optimist, but much of the world is pessimistic. ■

THE WESTERN SAHARA

(Continued from page 114)

operations run by some of their officers, who import goods from the Canary Islands and ship them north, probably in military vehicles. Furthermore, the Moroccan soldiers are unaccustomed to the terrain while Polisario forces are at home. Moroccan troops have also doubtless antagonized local populations, who report their movements and plans to Polisario.

Morocco is less and less able to pay for the war. Prices for its own phosphate exports have declined, and its oil bill has steadily risen. Inflation is over 12 percent a year, and unemployment is growing. Widespread strikes in 1978 and 1979 shook the government. Increased consciousness of corruption in high

places and obvious social inequalities strengthen the hand of opposing political parties like the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP). However, no matter how critical the USFP, the Communists and other parties may be on other issues, they support the war for Moroccan control over the Sahara.

Ordinary Moroccans also say they support the war, but if given the choice between a healthier economy and a steady job, on the one hand, and nationalist goals on the other, they would choose the former. Successful Polisario hit and run attacks on towns like Tan Tan and military garrisons have shaken public confidence. One journalist estimated that Polisario is killing about 150 Moroccan soldiers a month.¹⁴ Moroccans believe that Algeria is using Polisario as a proxy for its own ambitions: a weak Sahrawi state would have to ally itself with Algeria which, as a result, would become the dominant power in the Maghreb; its "hegemony," in Moroccan words, would be assured. Morocco has apparently made some gestures toward negotiation with Algeria. But because of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne's illness in 1978, a meeting never took place, and Algeria refused to permit a high-level Moroccan delegation to attend Boumedienne's funeral. On the other hand, the new Algerian President, Chadli Benjedid, went to Monrovia for the Sahara committee meeting under OAU auspices at the beginning of December, 1979, while Morocco boycotted it.

UNITED STATES DILEMMA

For support, Morocco has turned to Egypt and to France for jets, to Saudi Arabia for money and, recently, to the United States for important military equipment. This poses a serious problem for President Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress. Since 1960, the United States has sold weapons to Morocco with the stipulation that they be used only to defend Morocco proper. Because the United States does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, the use of American arms like F-5 bombers (already used) in the Sahara violates the 1960 agreement. In early 1978, the State Department announced that the United States would sell two dozen OV-10 Bronco airplanes and Cobra helicopters and other matériel to the king, but congressional opposition stopped the sale. American manufacturers succeeded in shipping a sophisticated radar system, FAAR, in early 1979, and the government also approved the sale of helicopters.

Although many American officials believe that these sales will not permit the Moroccans to win a decisive victory, they hope to gain some leverage over decision-making in Rabat, to encourage Morocco to negotiate a political settlement with Algeria and Polisario. As the conflict continues, the threat of direct war with Algeria increases, and although Morocco's

¹⁴Mario Pelletier, "La grande offensive marocaine dans le Sahara," in *Le Devoir* (Montreal), December 3, 1979, p. 8.

population of 20 million is slightly larger than Algeria's population of 18 million, its 100,000 man army is reportedly not so well trained or equipped as Algeria's army.

The pressure on the United States to help Morocco is intense because Morocco is a political ally of NATO countries. Although it supported Syria in the 1967 Middle East War, it sent troops to Zaire, a country close to France and the United States, to put down a rebellion in Shaba Province in 1977 and 1978. The king has reportedly supported American peace efforts in the Middle East, and although Morocco has very close economic relations with the Soviet Union, the king and other Moroccan leaders are anti-Communist. Not least important, Morocco has a rather open political system with far more freedom of expression, religion and association than any of its neighbors.

Nonetheless, the United States has closer economic ties with Algeria. Nine percent of the oil imported by the United States comes from Algeria, and the United States exports more to Algeria than to Morocco.¹⁵ Politically, however, the Algerians are closer to Moscow. The leaders regard themselves as socialists and revolutionaries, with a duty to fight the so-called imperialist West although privately they are said to have a pragmatic outlook favorable to closer relations with the United States.

Strong opposition to assistance for Morocco comes from American organizations like the American Committee on Africa and from influential political personalities like Congressman Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.), chairman of the African subcommittee in the House of Representatives. Solarz traveled to Africa in August, 1979, and concluded the United States should not sell more arms to Morocco. He believes that Polisario is a legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people and that it is bound to win in the long run. In his view, the United States has nothing to fear from a Polisario victory and would deeply offend members of the Organization of African Unity if it gave military support to Morocco.¹⁶

Scholars like John Damis believe that a Saharan state "would sow the seeds of instability in north-western Africa for a generation."¹⁷ Even Polisario implicitly recognizes the weakness of any eventual state; its representatives have expressed a muted desire for some renewed Spanish involvement,¹⁸ perhaps as a way to escape from dependence on Algeria

and Libya. In I. William Zartman's view, the United States should give diplomatic support to Morocco while encouraging Morocco to ratify the 1972 treaty with Algeria and to agree to some autonomy for the northern part of the Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. In his view, the southern part of the Sahara could be more or less federated with Mauritania, and Polisario should have a political role there.¹⁹

The Sahara is probably the best example today of a situation in which United States military involvement, direct or indirect, would bring negative consequences to American global interests without resolving the local African conflict. Coordinated African, Arab, American, French and Spanish pressure on Morocco, Algeria and Polisario for negotiation would contribute to a peaceful solution and to the eventual development of this region, affiliated in some way with Morocco. Promises of assistance for development may also allow Morocco's friends to encourage needed reforms in that country. ■

THE RETURN OF CIVILIAN RULE IN NIGERIA AND GHANA

(Continued from page 129)

during the first half of 1979 and drafted a constitution, which featured a popularly elected executive President limited to two four-years terms, a single chamber National Assembly of 140 members with substantial powers independent of the executive, a Cabinet whose members could not also be legislators and who required Assembly confirmation, and an independent judiciary, ombudsman, electoral commission and press commission (which would oversee the state press). The constitution included these independent bodies in a renewed attempt to check untrammelled executive authority.

The major political parties that emerged in early 1979 reflected the long-standing cleavage between remnants of Nkrumah's Convention People's party (CPP), no longer a populist party and with many new young political aspirants, and the intelligentsia-chiefly-Ashanti opposition to the CPP, which became the Progress party during 1969-1972 and whose lawyer-professional leaders had been in a state of permanent opposition to Acheampong. This fundamental cleavage in Ghanaian politics was modified by the dominance in both these groups of a new corps of lawyers, businessmen, professors, other professionals and ex-senior civil servants and by the fact that the two underdeveloped northern regions in Ghana adhered to one or another of these groups on the basis of the benefits to be extracted from government.

Old CPP stalwarts, led by former CPP minister Imoru Egala from the Upper Region, inaugurated the People's National party (PNP) and proudly proclaimed its CPP antecedents. Although the "old

¹⁵Statement by Steven Weissman, Staff Associate, House Sub-Committee on Africa, African Studies Association.

¹⁶Stephen J. Solarz, "Arms for Morocco?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1979/80, pp. 278-299.

¹⁷John Damis, "America's Morocco Policy," *The New York Times*, August 20, 1979, p. A21.

¹⁸Zartman, in *Hearings*, July 23-24, 1979, p. 139.

¹⁹Madjid Abdullallah, statement made at a meeting of the African Studies Association.

guard" CPP heavily and financially supported the PNP, only a few of the youngest contested for National Assembly seats; the "old guard" was pushed firmly into the background by a new generation of lawyers, doctors, professors and other upper middle class professionals. When Egala was banned from contesting for the presidency, he personally selected his nephew, a political unknown and a career diplomat, Hilla Limann, as PNP presidential candidate. This decision caused dissension but was ultimately ratified by a delegates' conference. Limann was the first major party leader from the northern regions. The PNP developed a widespread organization in a remarkably short time, with broad support in all regions, although least in the old Progress party's (PP) core support area in Ashanti.

The former PP leadership was split between two parties, the Popular Front party (PFP) led by Victor Owusu, an Ashanti lawyer and foreign minister during 1970-1972, and the United National Convention (UNC), led by the old nationalist and later PP leader and minister, William Ofori-Atta. The UNC had less but broader support than the PFP, drawing on Ofori-Atta's Akim-Abuakwa ethnic background in the Eastern region, strong Ewe constituencies in the Volta region, and some core Ga support and alliances in the capital, Accra. The Action Congress party (ACP) was formed and led by retired Colonel Frank Bernasko, who had been the energetic and popular Minister of Agriculture under Acheampong and who had left the government and military before his reputation was tarnished. He developed substantial support in the Fanti areas of the Central and Western Region. The other parties were minor: the Social Democratic Front (SDF), initially supported by the leadership of the strong Trade Union Congress (TUC), with little attempt to mobilize worker support for it; and John Bilson's Third Force party (TFP), representing the forlorn hope that a new ground could be found independent of the old CPP-PP rivalry.

Although the mutiny of junior officers and other ranks against senior military officers occurred in early June, the leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by AFRC chairman Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings recognized that the elections should proceed, promising that civilian rule would be restored after a three-month delay. In the June 18, 1979, election, the PNP won 71 of the 140 Assembly seats, winning a majority of seats in all regions except Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo. PNP presidential candidate Hilla Limann won an unexpected 35.8 percent of the vote. The PFP won 42 seats, and Owusu won 29.9 percent of the presidential poll, while the UNC won only 13 seats but 17.6 percent of the presidential poll. If the old PP leaders had united behind a single party (i.e., the PFP-UNC together), they would probably not have won a majority of Assembly seats, but

might have run first in the presidential polling. In the run-off presidential election between PNP's Hilla Limann and the PFP's Victor Owusu, a bandwagon effect developed for Limann, who won 62 percent of the vote.

The bloody mutiny in the military only two weeks before the national elections and less than a month before the scheduled military handover to civilians and the seizure of power by junior officers in the AFRC posed major dilemmas for the civilian politicians. The initial causes of the mutiny were the belief of junior officers that the Constituent Assembly had indemnified the military leaders against any future prosecution and the government's decision to free Acheampong from confinement. When it appeared that those military leaders and others who had stolen enormous sums would escape scot-free, the military exploded, fired by the undoubtedly genuine moral outrage of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. In the initial mutiny, senior officers were attacked and some were killed, while others had their heads shaven as a sign of disgrace. Thereafter officers retained little authority among the ranks. The initial interest of the AFRC, composed of junior officers, noncoms and privates, was to bring the senior officers to justice. They were tried in secret before a military Revolutionary Tribunal and eight officers were quickly found guilty of corruption and abuse of authority and were executed, including three former heads of state, Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo. Several dozen others were sentenced to from 25 to 75 years at hard labor, with all their assets confiscated.

Closely related AFRC goals were to smash corruption and mismanagement in Ghana's public institutions, to end the hoarding of goods, and to enforce price controls, all of which AFRC and military units undertook with enormous energy and overwhelming, ecstatic public support. To a nation grown cynical because of the blatant corruption of its rulers, exhausted and impoverished by a never-ending and ruinous inflation (which generated further corruption at all levels), bitter at their elite's prosperity, and dispirited by the absence of honest rulers, AFRC was welcomed as an avenging angel. Jerry Rawlings insisted that AFRC's mission was to generate a moral revitalization among Ghanaians and to spur them to hold their leaders accountable; thus Rawlings became a hero to millions of Ghanaians, warning that the AFRC would monitor the government's promise to continue the revolution. As AFRC broadened the scope of its investigations until they included all public institutions and their leadership, it looked as if it might be creating a revolution. But its investigation remained primarily a "cleansing mission," which struck fear into all of Ghana's elites; as one by one and in groups they were required to report to military

(Continued on page 144)

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1980, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Afghanistan Crisis

Jan. 2—In Kabul, Afghan President Barak Karmal makes his 1st public appearance.

Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. President Jimmy Carter asks the U.S. Senate to delay consideration of the SALT II treaty and recalls U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas J. Watson, Jr.

Jan. 3—The Soviet official press agency Tass calls U.S. President Jimmy Carter "wicked and malicious" for calling the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan an "invasion."

Some 40 nations call for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider the problem of Afghanistan.

Jan. 4—U.S. President Jimmy Carter announces that the U.S. will act diplomatically to punish the Soviet Union.

Jan. 6—The Pakistan government reports that there are 402,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Jan. 7—U.S. State Department spokesmen claim there are 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union vetoes a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; the vote is 13 to 2 with East Germany siding with the Soviet Union.

Jan. 9—The Security Council votes 12 to 2 with Zambia abstaining to place the Afghanistan question before an emergency session of the General Assembly.

Jan. 10—The U.S. State Department reports that Muslim insurgents are fighting Soviet troops around Jalalabad, about 50 miles from the Pakistan border.

Jan. 11—A State Department spokesman reports that between 900 and 1,200 Soviet soldiers have been killed or wounded in fighting with Afghan rebels.

In Kabul, President Karmal tells a press conference with foreign reporters that the Soviet Union was asked for assistance by the Afghan Revolutionary Council before President Hafizullah Amin was overthrown.

Jan. 14—In a message to Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Karmal says that his government "will never allow anybody to use our soil as a base against the Islamic revolution of Iran . . . and we expect our Iranian brethren to assume a reciprocal stance." More than 30,000 Soviet soldiers are reported along the Iran-Afghanistan border.

Voting 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions and 12 absent, the U.N. General Assembly "demands the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan."

Jan. 17—The Afghan government expels all U.S. correspondents because they have been an "interference in the country's internal affairs."

Jan. 21—The Afghan government accuses the late President Hafizullah Amin of spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Jan. 24—In Islamabad, Pakistan, Zia Khan Nassry, chairman of the Afghan Islamic and Revolutionary party, says his forces control the provinces of Paktia, Ghazni and Logar in eastern Afghanistan. He proclaims a "Free Islamic Republic" in those areas and asks for foreign aid.

Because it fears the Soviet Union, the Pakistan government asks Nassry to leave the country within 24 hours.

Reports from Kabul indicate that the Karmal government has released political prisoners and abolished Amin's secret police.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Jan. 14—With 127 countries assenting, the World Bank's capital stock increase of \$40 billion is approved by the board of governors; this virtually doubles the capital stock of the bank.

Iran Crisis

(See also *Iran*)

Jan. 2—In Teheran, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh to negotiate for the release of the 50 U.S. hostages being held in the U.S. embassy.

Jan. 4—Iranian militants holding the American hostages demand that the Iranian Foreign Ministry turn over U.S. chargé d'affaires L. Bruce Laingen.

Waldheim leaves Teheran and returns to New York without reaching any agreement on the hostages.

Jan. 5—Ghotbzadeh asks the Ayatollah Khomeini to decide whether to turn Laingen over to the militant students.

Jan. 11—Ghotbzadeh sends an arrest warrant to Panama for Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi.

Jan. 12—At the U.N., Iranian delegate Mansour Farhang proposes to release the hostages if the U.S. agrees to recognize the legitimacy of Iran's demands that the Shah be extradited and that his fortune be turned over to the Iranian government.

Iranian Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moinefar says that Iran will not deliver oil to any country that supports an economic boycott against Iran.

Jan. 13—The Soviet Union vetoes a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing economic sanctions on Iran.

Jan. 15—The Ministry of National Guidance issues a deadline of midnight tonight for the filing of dispatches by U.S.-associated journalists and says the journalists must leave the country by January 18.

Jan. 21—The U.S. files a 82-page brief with the International Court of Justice in The Hague, seeking the release of the American hostages in Iran.

Jan. 23—Iran radio claims the Shah is under arrest in Panama. Panama denies the report.

Jan. 28—In Teheran, Canada temporarily closes its embassy.

Jan. 29—After an account in *La Presse*, a Montreal newspaper, it is announced in Washington, D.C., that 6 U.S. diplomats flew out of Teheran January 26-27 disguised as Canadian diplomats. The six had been hiding in the Canadian embassy.

Jan. 30—Ghotbzadeh warns that "sooner or later . . . Canada will pay" for aiding the 6 Americans to escape through the Canadian embassy in Teheran; he adds that "harshness . . . may be imposed" on the hostages.

Jan. 31—Muslim militants holding the American hostages say that they will only free their captives on order of Ayatollah Khomeini and will not obey an order to do so from Iran's newly elected President, Bani-Sadr.

Islamic Conference

Jan. 29—Some 30 Islamic foreign ministers, meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan, demand "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on Afghan territories."

Middle East

Jan. 7—Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin arrives in Aswan for his ninth meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Jan. 10—Sadat and Begin conclude their meeting.

Jan. 22—The Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip postpones the scheduled April municipal elections until Israel, the U.S., and Egypt can agree on the establishment of a self-governing council for Palestinians.

Jan. 25—Israeli forces complete their withdrawal from 5,500 square miles of the Sinai and return the area to Egypt.

Jan. 26—In accordance with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty the Egyptian-Israeli border is opened.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Jan. 28—Saudi Arabia raises the price of its oil by \$2.00 per barrel to \$26.00, retroactive to January 1.

Jan. 29—Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates raise their oil by \$2.00 a barrel to \$28.00.

Southeast Asian Refugees

Jan. 6—U.S. sources report that since October, 1979, the U.S. has given international agencies over \$58 million for Cambodian relief efforts.

Jan. 12—After spending 3 days in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, U.S. Coordinator of Refugees Victor Palmieri says that the U.S. has promised to admit 3,000 refugees a month from Malaysia.

Jan. 14—U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Paoul Hartling says that because of refugees from Afghanistan and Pakistan his office will need twice the \$150 million allocated to his office for 1980.

Steadfastness and Confrontation Front

Jan. 16—Syria convenes a meeting in Damascus of the hardline members of the "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front," consisting of Syria, Algeria, Libya, Southern Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Afghanistan Crisis, Iran Crisis*)

Jan. 7—Mexico wins the vacant seat on the 15-member Security Council; Cuba had hoped to win the seat.

AFGHANISTAN

(See *Intl, Afghanistan Crisis*)

ALGERIA

Jan. 20—In Paris, Foreign Minister Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia completes a 3-day conference with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

CAMBODIA

Jan. 30—U.S. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d reports the heaviest fighting of the year between Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Cambodian forces opposed to the Vietnamese-backed regime of

Heng Samrin in an area on the Cambodian-Thai border near the refugee camps.

CANADA

(See also *Intl, Iran Crisis*)

Jan. 21—The government expels 2 Soviet embassy military attachés and an embassy chauffeur on charges of spying against the U.S.

CHILE

Jan. 19—Copper workers in the El Teniente mine go on strike after refusing to accept a 9 percent wage increase.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 16—Senior Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping says that the clause in the constitution permitting citizens to put up wall posters will be deleted at the next session of the National People's Congress.

Jan. 18—In Islamabad, Foreign Minister Huang Hua arrives for talks with Pakistani officials.

Jan. 19—The Foreign Ministry cancels talks with the Soviet Union on improving relations because of the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Jan. 27—The New China News Agency reports that the use of foreign currency in China will soon be prohibited; the government will issue "foreign exchange certificates" for foreign visitors.

CUBA

Jan. 11—In a Cabinet shuffle, President Fidel Castro takes personal control of the Defense, Interior, Public Health and Culture Ministries.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 5—Saad Mortada is appointed the first ambassador to Israel.

EL SALVADOR

Jan. 2—Junta members Guillermo Manuel Ungo Revelo and Roman Mayorga Quiros resign from the Cabinet; they charge that the government is moving too slowly to improve social conditions.

Jan. 4—In San Salvador, members of the February 28 Popular Leagues attack the National Guard headquarters; 2 civilians are killed and 2 guards are injured.

FRANCE

(See *Algeria, India*)

ICELAND

Jan. 29—Caretaker Prime Minister Benedikt Grondal informs President Kristjan Eldjarn that he is unable to form a new government.

INDIA

Jan. 3—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held.

Jan. 9—Election returns give the Congress-I party of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a two-thirds majority in Parliament; the party wins 350 seats out of 542 in the lower house; 20 independents pledge their support.

Jan. 14—Indira Gandhi is sworn in as Prime Minister.

Jan. 15—Special court judge Mangi Lal Jain dismisses 2 cases against Gandhi for illegally detaining opposition leaders and for harassing Ministry of Industry officials when she was Prime Minister.

Jan. 29—At the conclusion of a state visit in New Delhi, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi issue a joint statement calling for a relaxation of tensions on the subcontinent.

Opposition members in Parliament accuse government officials of arresting N.K. Singh, a police official who worked on the case of Sanjay Gandhi, Gandhi's son. Home Minister Zail Singh denies the charges.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Afghanistan Crisis, Iran Crisis*)

Jan. 4—In Qum and in Tabriz, fighting is reported between supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, who represents the Azerbaijanis.

Jan. 5—In Qum, Shariat-Madari issues a statement disassociating himself from the militant Azerbaijanis in Tabriz.

Jan. 6—Teheran radio reports continuing fighting between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Lingeh, a Persian Gulf port city.

In Isfahan, Abbas Bahrainian, a member of the Isfahan governing committee, is assassinated.

Jan. 7—Ayatollah Khomeini announces that he will go into seclusion on January 12 for 15 days.

The acting governor of Kurdistan, Hossein Shahveisi, resigns after 2 weeks in office.

Jan. 10—The government announces the arrest of 15 members of Forghan, a militant fundamentalist Muslim group, for the assassination of several supporters of Khomeini.

Jan. 12—In Tabriz, 11 Azerbaijani rebels are tried and executed by government troops.

Jan. 17—Finance Minister Abolhassan Bani-Sadr says the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an attempt to divide Iran and take over the Indian Ocean area.

Jan. 19—It is reported that Iranian troops are stationed along the Afghan border near Herat.

In Tabriz, Hassan Yazdani, director of the Tabriz jail, says that 25 members of the Iranian air force have been arrested on charges of conspiring to carry out a coup.

Jan. 23—In Teheran, Khomeini is admitted to the hospital for a heart ailment.

Jan. 26—In Teheran, Bani-Sadr wins approximately 3 million of the 4 million votes cast in yesterday's presidential election.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Jan. 2—In Parliament, the government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin survives 4 no-confidence motions, presented by members opposed to the government's decision to delay the evacuation of Israeli settlers from Elon Moreh.

Jan. 13—The Cabinet appoints Eliahu Ben-Elissar as ambassador to Egypt.

Jan. 15—The Central Statistics Bureau reports a 1979 consumer price rise of 111.4 percent.

Jan. 17—Israeli settlers at Elon Moreh agree to move.

Jan. 27—In Tel Aviv, 12 major unions call for a work stoppage to protest continuing inflation.

JAPAN

Jan. 18—Retired Major General Yukihisa Miyana and 2 associates are arrested on charges of spying for the Soviet Union.

Jan. 28—Citing his overall responsibility for the Defense Ministry, Army Chief of Staff Shigeto Nakano resigns;

10 senior military officers are reprimanded for lack of discipline in the wake of the Miyana spy scandal.

KOREA, NORTH

(See also *South Korea*)

Jan. 12—In a letter to South Korean officials, Prime Minister Li Chong Ok suggests that political talks be held with South Korean officials.

Jan. 30—North Korea's Prime Minister Li Chong Ok says that North Korea will begin preliminary talks with South Korea on February 6.

KOREA, SOUTH

Jan. 14—A special session of the Cabinet is held to discuss the January 12 North Korean proposal for political talks.

Jan. 24—Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwak suggests that high-level talks to arrange for a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the 2 countries begin on February 6.

Jan. 25—Former President Yun Po Sun is sentenced to 2 years in prison for violating a martial law decree by organizing a demonstration against the government; 16 others are also sentenced to prison.

Jan. 28—The Appeals Court of the Martial Law Command confirms the death sentence imposed on Kim Jae Kyu for the assassination of President Park Chung Hee.

Jan. 29—Prison sentences for former President Yun Po Sun and Ham Sok Hun (convicted of encouraging government opposition) are commuted because of their advanced age.

LIBYA

Jan. 5—The Libyan press agency reports that the government has broken relations with Fatah, the Palestinian commando group, and has suspended all aid to Fatah.

MAURITANIA

Jan. 4—Prime Minister Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla overthrows President Mohammed Mahmoud Ould Louly and his 3 top aides.

MEXICO

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

NETHERLANDS

Jan. 31—Queen Juliana announces that she will abdicate on April 30, 1980, in favor of her eldest daughter, Princess Beatrix.

NICARAGUA

Jan. 3—The revolutionary government reinstates civil rights, suspended 6 months ago.

PAKISTAN

(See *Intl, Afghanistan Crisis; China; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 15—President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq appeals for international aid and support because of the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Jan. 17—In Islamabad, President Zia says a reported U.S. offer of \$400 million in aid is "peanuts."

PANAMA

(See *Intl, Iran Crisis*)

PORTUGAL

Jan. 3—In Lisbon, President António Ramalho Eanes administers the oath of office to Prime Minister Francisco Sá Carneiro.

RHODESIA

- Jan. 4—In accord with the London conference agreement, an estimated 17,300 guerrillas report to cease-fire holding camps by midnight.
- Jan. 5—Prime Minister Abel T. Muzorewa claims that less than one-third of the guerrillas waiting in the camps are "genuine guerrillas"; he says many guerrillas have sent substitutes.
- Jan. 8—In Maputo, Mozambique, co-leader of the Patriotic Front Robert Mugabe says he wrote British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to complain that British Governor Lord Soames has violated 3 aspects of the agreement; among the violations are the continuing presence of South African troops and the use of the Rhodesian army against guerrillas who have not reported to the truce camps. Mugabe says he will disregard the truce if the situation is not changed.
- Jan. 11—Air service is restored between Salisbury and London; it was broken off in November, 1965.
- Jan. 13—In Salisbury, Patriotic Front co-leader Joshua Nkomo returns to Rhodesia after 3 1/2 years in exile.
- Jan. 27—In Salisbury, Zimbabwe African National Union leader Robert Mugabe is greeted at the airport by 150,000 supporters. Before his return from Mozambique, he released 71 political prisoners he was holding in Mozambique.

SOUTH AFRICA

- Jan. 25—In Pretoria, 3 black nationalists belonging to the outlawed African National Congress are killed by police after they seize a bank and hold 25 people hostage.

SPAIN

- Jan. 11—Catalonia and the Basque region become autonomous areas; elections for regional offices will be held in March, 1980.
- Jan. 14—In Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez meets with U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
- Jan. 25—Defense Minister Agustin Rodríguez Sahagún denies a report by *Diario 16*, a tabloid partly financed by Suárez's Union of the Democratic Center, that there has been an unsuccessful military coup d'état.

SYRIA

- Jan. 9—President Hafez al-Assad asks Governor of Damascus Abdel Rauf al-Kasm to form a new Cabinet; Kasm is leader of the ruling Baath Socialist party. Prime Minister Mohammed Ali al-Halabi will remain in office until a new government is formed.
- Jan. 11—It is reported that President Assad has recently replaced two-thirds of the members of the National Command, the 21-member body that heads the Baath Socialist party.
- Jan. 27—In Damascus, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko meets with Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam; he is also scheduled to meet with President Hafez al-Assad and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat.

TAIWAN

- Jan. 2—In Taipei, opposition leader Kang Ning-hsiang reports that in the last 2 weeks 10 more people have been arrested for taking part in an anti-government demonstration in December.

TURKEY

- Jan. 2—In a letter to President Fahri Koruturk, military

commanders warn the President that the country faces a general uprising and urge that the political parties unite to face internal and external challenges.

- Jan. 3—In response to yesterday's warning from the military, former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, leader of the opposition Republican People's party, agrees to support a package of government-proposed bills concerned with security.
- Jan. 9—In Washington, D.C., State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d announces that Turkey and the U.S. have agreed on the continuing use of military and intelligence bases in Turkey.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis; Canada; China; Syria; U.K.; U.S., Administration*)

- Jan. 2—In Moscow, Nobel-prize-winning physicist Andrei D. Sakharov calls on the U.S. to put pressure on the Soviet government to withdraw from Afghanistan in order to prevent escalation to a third world war.
- Jan. 3—In Moscow, *Pravda*, the Communist party newspaper, reports the "untimely death" of Viktor S. Paputin, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, reportedly head of the Soviet mission to Afghanistan.
- Jan. 7—*Pravda* warns Pakistan against allowing Afghan insurgents to use Pakistan as a "base for the preparation of imperialist aggression" against Afghanistan.
- Jan. 22—In Moscow, Andrei Sakharov is arrested and stripped of his awards; he and his wife are put on a plane and sent to Gorky, a military center closed to foreigners. It is reported in Muscat, Oman, that a Soviet ship was stationed in the Strait of Hormuz 3 weeks after the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran. The Strait of Hormuz links the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
- Jan. 24—In response to U.S. President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union Address to Congress, Tass denounces Carter's claim that the Persian Gulf is of vital interest to the U.S. as an "absurdity."
- Jan. 25—Tass says that Sakharov will not be put on trial and that he and his wife have simply "changed their place of residence to Gorky."
- Official economic figures released today put the industrial growth rate for 1979 at 3.9 percent, the lowest since World War II.
- Jan. 28—Ministry of Culture spokesman Vladimir I. Litvinov says that Soviet performing groups and individual performers will not be allowed to go to the U.S. until a new cultural exchange agreement is signed; the old agreement expired December 31, 1979.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Rhodesia*)

- Jan. 17—In an address to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher says her government favors an attempt to move the 1980 Olympics from Moscow.
- Jan. 24—In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the government announces diplomatic sanctions against the Soviet Union, including the suspension of ministerial contacts.

Northern Ireland

- Jan. 7—A British-sponsored conference on a new constitution for Northern Ireland begins.
- Jan. 9—Conference chairman and Northern Ireland Secretary Humphrey Atkins adjourns the conference for 11 days.

UNITED STATES

Administration

- Jan. 2—President Jimmy Carter signs an executive order (approved by Congress on November 29) which reorganizes the government's handling of international trade. Trade-making policy will be the responsibility of the office of the Special Trade Representative (now the U.S. Trade Representative) and implementation will be the responsibility of an expanded Commerce Department, with import regulation enforcement taken over from the Treasury Department.
- Jan. 3—Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall publishes a Labor Department order in the *Federal Register*; the order, which takes effect February 3, will reduce the number of unemployed who receive extended benefits after the initial 26 weeks.
- Jan. 7—Vice President Walter Mondale says that the government will buy 14.5 million tons of grain from American concerns; this is the amount contracted for by the Soviet Union that has been embargoed.
- Jan. 11—At a White House briefing, Deputy Energy Secretary John C. Sawhill and other administration officials announce a program to encourage the production of some 5 billion gallons of gasohol (90 percent gasoline and 10 percent alcohol) by the middle of 1981.
- Jan. 14—In a 400-page report to Congress from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Surgeon General of the United States Julius Richmond says that the incidence of lung cancer is increasing rapidly in American women and may surpass breast cancer as the chief cancer-killer of women.
- Jan. 15—In U.S. District Court in Brooklyn, Judge John F. Dooling, Jr., declares that the so-called "Hyde amendment," which strictly limits federal payments for abortions, is unconstitutional; he rules that federal funds should be used for "medically necessary abortions provided by duly certified providers." He delays the implementation of his judgment for 30 days.
- Jan. 17—Interior Secretary Cecil D. Andrus announces that President Carter has approved a proposal for the private construction of a pipeline from Port Angeles, Washington, to Clearbrook, Minnesota; the \$1.6 billion project may be completed in 2 years.
- Jan. 21—The White House announces that the Department of Agriculture will buy some 15,000 metric tons of frozen chickens that were earmarked for export to the Soviet Union, to prevent wide fluctuations in the wholesale chicken market.
- President Carter sends his written State of the Union Message to Congress; he calls for enactment of important legislation left over from last year, reduction of the budget deficit and the inflation rate, new youth-training programs, and an aid package for Pakistan.
- Jan. 23—President Carter delivers part 2 of his State of the Union Address to a joint session of Congress. He says that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be "repelled by use of any means necessary, including force." He calls for the renewal of draft registration.
- Jan. 31—In a civil complaint in U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., the Securities and Exchange Commission charges that G. William Miller, chairman of Textron Inc., until 1979, and now Secretary of the Treasury, knew that Textron had spent some \$600,000 "improperly" to entertain Defense Department officials and made "improper" payments abroad. Textron agrees to a settlement without admitting or denying the charges.

Economy

- Jan. 10—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.8 percent in December, 1979.
- Jan. 11—The Labor Department reports that the nation's employment rate was 5.9 percent for December, 1979.
- Jan. 18—The Commerce Department reports that for the 4th quarter of 1979 the GNP grew at a rate of 1.4 percent.
- Jan. 21—Gold reaches \$838.50 a troy ounce at the close of the London market; during the day, gold reached \$875 an ounce.
- Jan. 22—Gold suffers a record one-day fall of \$145 an ounce on the London and New York markets.
- Jan. 25—Citibank raises its prime rate to 15.25 percent.
- The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 1.2 percent in December, 1979, and that consumer prices rose 13.3 percent in 1979, the largest annual increase in 33 years.
- The Exxon Corporation announces record 1979 profits of \$4.26 billion; the company was probably the world's largest industrial concern in 1979.
- Jan. 29—The largest quarterly loss in corporate history is reported by the United States Steel Corporation, reporting a loss of \$561.7 million for the 4th quarter of 1979.
- Jan. 30—In his annual economic Report to Congress, President Jimmy Carter says that inflation and rising unemployment will persist in 1980.
- The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators was unchanged in December 1979.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Afghanistan Crisis, Iran Crisis; Cambodia; Pakistan; Turkey; U.S.S.R.*)

- Jan. 3—The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service reports that it has started a search for some 9,000 Iranian students who failed to report during the 6-week reporting period; 56,580 Iranian students reported before the December 31, 1979, deadline.
- The Department of Agriculture reports that today the Soviet Union bought 2.7 million metric tons of corn and 400,000 metric tons of wheat for delivery in the next 9 months; this single-day purchase, officials believe, is in anticipation of a possible U.S. embargo.
- The State Department reports that the U.S. will sell Taiwan \$280-million worth of anti-aircraft missiles and defensive weapons, but no advanced fighter planes.
- Jan. 5—Secretary of Defense Harold Brown arrives in Beijing, China, for 8 days of conferences.
- Jan. 8—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says that the U.S. is suspending the opening of a new U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York City.
- Jan. 9—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says that the U.S. is going ahead with plans for the military use of port facilities, airfields and other installations in Oman, Kenya and Somalia.
- Jan. 13—Defense Secretary Harold Brown arrives in Tokyo for conferences.

State Department officials report that the U.S. is considering offering Pakistan an additional \$200 million in economic and military aid in fiscal 1980 and another \$200 million for the next fiscal year.

President Jimmy Carter sends Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper to Europe to discuss European participation in a program to aid Pakistan.

Jan. 14—President of the Marshall Islands Amata Kabua and U.S. negotiator Peter Rosenblatt initial an agreement in Honolulu that gives limited independence to the Marshalls; the U.S. retains military and security rights in the more than 600-island chain in the South Pacific. The agreement must be approved by an island plebiscite and the U.S. President and Congress.

Jan. 20—White House aides report that President Carter informed Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarek last week in Washington, D.C., that he expects to ask Congress for some \$1.1 billion in extra arms aid for Egypt in the next 2 years.

Jan. 24—The Defense Department announces that the U.S. is willing to sell China military equipment, but not weapons.

In Beijing, U.S. and Chinese officials sign a "memorandum of understanding" to build a receiving station in China for the reception of data from a U.S. satellite.

The House and Senate approve granting most-favored-nation status to China.

Labor and Industry

Jan. 10—Ex-president of the AFL-CIO George Meany dies.

Jan. 16—In a 4 to 1 vote, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorizes the Nuclear Fuel Services plant in Erwin, Tennessee, to reopen, although 20 pounds of enriched uranium are still not accounted for.

Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall announces comprehensive rules for the regulation of carcinogenic substances used in industry.

Legislation

(See also *Administration, Economy*)

Jan. 2—President Jimmy Carter vetoes a bill that would require a federal study of the health effects of "agent orange," a defoliant; he thinks the bill is unconstitutional.

Jan. 3—The second session of the 96th Congress is called to order.

Jan. 7—President Carter signs the bill guaranteeing \$1.5 billion in private loans made to the Chrysler Corporation.

Jan. 28—President Jimmy Carter sends his fiscal 1981 budget to Congress: he calls for a reduced rate of inflation and a 3.3 percent increase (after inflation) in the arms budget. The proposed budget totals \$615.8 billion, with a proposed deficit of \$15.8 billion (a reduction in the deficit of 60 percent over fiscal 1980); the military budget is set at \$142.7 billion.

Jan. 29—Voting 88 to 4, the Senate approves a resolution calling for a U.S. boycott of the Olympic Games, unless the games are moved from Moscow, postponed or cancelled, regardless of whether the Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan. The House approved a similar resolution on January 24.

Politics

Jan. 21—In the Iowa precinct presidential caucuses, Republican presidential candidate George Bush defeats former California Governor Ronald Reagan; President Jimmy Carter is a nearly 2 to 1 winner over Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.).

Supreme Court

Jan. 19—Former Associate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas dies at the age of 81; he served on the court for a record 36 years.

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 3—In Ljubljana, President Tito is hospitalized for an "examination of his leg blood vessels."

Jan. 21—In Belgrade, doctors report that Tito is in good condition following the removal of his left leg yesterday.

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

(See *Rhodesia*)

NIGERIA AND GHANA

(Continued from page 138)

barracks, many fled the country. Some AFRC leaders wanted to deepen the military mission. But others knew that profound ethnic and other fissures were already appearing within the military, that its attacks on market women and traders and its public canings were again creating a fear of the military, and that an attempt to remain in power would rekindle public opposition and destroy the military completely.

The impact of AFRC's four months in power was profound and important, but it did not solve Limann's problems. It restored hope to Ghanaians and reintroduced moral force in public life; and it created the possibility that the PNP government could be a far better government than it would otherwise have been. But it also created a military and police with little coherence and discipline, a potential source of new military coups. As a condition of the transfer of power to a civilian government, on September 24, 1979, the PNP had to agree to continue AFRC's investigations and not to reverse any sentences of its secret tribunal. Limann felt compelled to retire Rawlings and two senior officers who publicly attacked his actions and sought reinstatement. The forced sales of commodities at control prices emptied Ghana of goods, and farmers have withheld their produce from the market and invested little in renewed plantings, which means a shortfall of food in the spring of 1980. Though Limann promised to "flood Ghana with goods" for Christmas, 1979, Ghana has little or no foreign exchange, and the IMF is again demanding an austerity program of reduced government expenditures and bank credits and a devaluation, in exchange for new foreign loans. Ghanaians hope that the new government will undertake spending programs to increase the level of economic activity, but the government has few resources. In this sense, Ghana has regained democratic rule under the worst possible circumstances. And military rule has been totally discredited.

The restoration of democratic civilian rule is no guarantee that the governments of Ghana and Nigeria will be able to cope with endemic social conflicts or to fashion economic development policies that generate growth instead of distributing the overwhelming proportion of benefits to a small but growing bourgeoisie of businessmen, professionals, and bureaucrats, ignoring the needs of workers and peasants.

Available From Current History

Academic Year 1979-1980

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy (5-6/79) | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia, 1979 (12/79) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Arms and Foreign Aid (7-8/79) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1980 (1/80) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1979 (9/79) | <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1980 (2/80) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1979 (10/79) | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1980 (3/80) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (11/79) | <input type="checkbox"/> The World of Islam (4/80) |

Still Available

AREA STUDIES

- ☐ India and South Asia (4/79)
- ☐ Africa, 1979 (3/79)
- ☐ Latin America, 1979 (2/79)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1979 (1/79)
- ☐ Southeast Asia (12/78)
- ☐ Japan (11/78)
- ☐ East Europe, 1978 (4/78)
- ☐ Latin America, 1978 (2/78)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1978 (1/78)
- ☐ Africa, 1977 (12/77)
- ☐ West Europe, 1977 (11/77)

- ☐ Canada, 1977 (4/77)
- ☐ Mexico, 1977 (3/77)

AMERICAN ISSUES

- ☐ America's Energy Policy Tomorrow (7-8/78)
- ☐ America's Energy Resources: An Overview (5-6/78)
- ☐ The World Energy Crisis (3/78)
- ☐ Improving Health Care in America (7-8/77)
- ☐ Health Care in America: An Overview (5-6/77)
- ☐ Reforming the Criminal Justice System (7-8/76)
- ☐ Criminal Justice in America (6/76)
- ☐ Women in America (5/76)
- ☐ The American Indian (12/74)

CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

A sturdy, hard-cover binder at a reasonable cost will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. Each issue can be placed in the binder every month. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods.

ONE-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION: \$17.75. **TWO-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION:** \$35.00.

EIGHT-MONTH SUBSCRIPTION: \$14.25.

SPECIFIC ISSUE PRICE: \$2.25 per copy; 10 or more copies of the same issue, \$1.55.
Copies more than two years old, \$2.75 per copy.

EIGHT-MONTH BULK SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR CLASS USE: for 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address, \$12.25 each.

BINDER PRICE: \$6.95.

CURRENT HISTORY • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER: your choice of 3 free issues.

- ☐ 1 year \$17.75, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ 2 years \$35.00, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Send me 8-month subscriptions

- ☐ Current History Binders
at \$6.95 each.

Name

Address

City State Zip Code

- ☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add \$1.50 per year for Canada; \$1.50 per year for foreign.

All these offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Specific issue price and bulk subscription prices are based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

CL 300 LIB 9 EB 001 C DEC 80
AMBASSADOR COLLEGE
LIBRARY
300 W GREEN ST
PASADENA CA 91332